Twilight in the East

THE EASTERN FRONT in WW1

PLAY BOOK

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28.0 SCENARIO GENERAL SET-UP

EXPLANATION

28.1 Organizing the Units

Prior to setting up, the Russian player should separate his units based on the color of the unit type symbol (see 3.2.1), treating each group separately for setup. The Central Powers player should separate the Austrian units and the German 3 LW Corps units into one group, and the remaining German units into another group.

Both players should then sort the units of each group into the following subgroups, as per the setup grids:

- Informational markers, pontoons, railheads, and railway units;
- Fortresses;
- Army units and leaders;
- Units attached to corps, and their detachments;
- Independent infantry divisions, and their detachments;
- Independent infantry brigades;
- Infantry asset units;
- Cavalry divisions;
- Cavalry asset units;
- Artillery units.

Within each subgroup, organize the units in alphanumeric order as in the setup grids. Match any Attachment markers to their respective units during this process.

28.2 The Setup Grids

Once so organized, find the scenario you wish to play on the appropriate setup grids, and place the units on the map and their markers on the indicated attachment tracks.

When playing the Campaign scenario (29.6), both players should refer to the right-most column on all the grids. When playing a smaller scenario, note that the scenarios listed differ by grid.

- The German grid lists setups only for scenarios 29.1, 29.5, and 29.7.
- The Austrian grid lists setups only for scenarios 29.2, 29.3, and 29.4, as well as units of the German 3 LW Corps, and the 3 lw and 4 lw asset units.
- The Russian grid is split into a North section (for scenarios 29.1, 29.5 and 29.7), a South section (for 29.2, 29.3, 29.4), and a Campaign section (for units that appear only in the Campaign game).

28.2.1 Unit Setup

For each scenario, the grid lists the following information for a unit:

- The GT the unit arrives (see 28.2.2.).
- >> The hex the unit starts or arrives in. In any scenario, if a unit is listed as starting outside the bounds of that scenario, it may enter the first GT unless there’s a specific mention otherwise.
- The mode the unit starts in, shown in parentheses. If none is listed, then it does not start in any special mode. The other possible modes are Rail Mode (see 28.2.3.), Incomplete 1 or 2 (see 24.3.), Deployed (see 17.5.), or with an Improved Position (IP—see 13.0).
- Any SP losses the unit starts with, shown in brackets next to its setup hex.
- For a Formation, the track and Army Organizational Display on which to place its Attachment marker. (See also 28.3.A.)
- Any Combat Effectiveness losses the unit starts with, shown in brackets next to its starting track.

EXAMPLE: In all the southern scenarios, the Russian combined cavalry division is listed as:

30.77 [–1] Ind./ FIFTH [–1]

Set up this unit in hex 30.77, not in any special mode, and (in this case) flip the unit over to its 2 step strength side (usually a 1 step Reduction marker would be placed under the unit). Place its Attachment marker on the Independent Formations track on the Fifth Army Organizational Display, in the –1 box.

28.2.2 Unit Availability and GT Numbers

- If a unit does not appear in a scenario, the grid lists Not in play for that unit.
- If a unit is in play, does not have a GT listed for it, then it starts the scenario on the map.
- If a unit is in play and has a GT of arrival listed for it, then it enters as a reinforcement on the GT indicated in the hex indicated. (See also 28.2.4.) A GT number in parentheses means the unit arrives during the Counter Movement Phase of the enemy player turn.
- An army’s Organizational Display is available when one of the army’s depot units becomes available. Exception: In scenario 29.2, the Austrian FOURTH Army display is available at start as per the scenario rules.
- If a unit is a reinforcement, place its Attachment marker on the Game Turn Record Track with the unit on the proper GT.
- For the Germans, a GT “number” of WF indicates the unit is a Western Front reinforcement, and will arrive between GT 9 and GT 14, as per 22.1.
- For scenario 29.7, Per Campaign means to refer to the information for scenario 29.6.

28.2.3 Units in Rail Mode

Some units begin a scenario in Rail Mode. Such units MUST detrain before expending MPs for any other purpose. These units may not use railroad movement until after detraining (and then entraining again).

28.2.4 Reinforcements and Rail Mode

Any reinforcing unit that arrives on a scenario map edge hex with a railroad line exiting the map edge may enter the game either via railroad movement or normal movement (16.0). A unit entering via railroad movement is in Rail Mode even if it is not marked as being in Rail Mode on the grid.

28.3 Other Setup Instructions

A. Attachment Markers: There are two types of attachment markers (3.8): Formation Attachment markers (with circled CE numbers) and Corps Attachment markers (without circles).

- Corps Attachment markers are placed in any empty Corps Box on the indicated army’s Organizational Display; in this way the adjacent track becomes the corps track for the formations attached to that corps (6.2.2).
- Formation Attachment markers are either placed on a corps track (6.2.2) or an Independent Formations track (6.2.3). Place each Attachment marker in the CE Status box of the proper track unless the grid indicates the unit starts with CE losses.
B. Army Area of Attachment Markers: Place markers to designate boundaries between each army. In doing so, each army’s Area of Attachment (6.1) is designated. Unless specifically indicated in a scenario’s setup, each boundary can be placed anywhere between the units assigned to adjacent armies. As mentioned in 6.1, use the countersheet “spines” labeled ‘Army Area of Attachment Boundary’, for marking these boundaries.

C. Army Markers: Place each army’s Army marker anywhere within that army’s Area of Attachment (6.1). Place the marker on either its front or back-side (as appropriate) to record whether the army is still on its Strategic Plan or not as designated in the setup for the selected scenario. The exact location of these markers is not relevant—they are just reminders to players as to which army is which, and whether each army is still on its Strategic Plan or not.

D. Objective Markers: For any army on a Strategic Plan, place its Objective markers on its objective hexes as a reminder of each army’s objective.

E. Fortress Units: Place any fortress unit in play in the hex indicated on the back of its counter.

F. Leaders: Place Khan Nakhichevanski and any other optional leader that may be in play on the Corps Train or Army marker with the same formation ID.

PLAY NOTE: Playtesters suggested that the Leader markers with negative effects should be given to the opponent to hold so that they would not be “overlooked” during play.

G. Rail Points (RPs) Markers: Place each nation’s RPs markers on the Rail Point tracks as mentioned below in 28.6.

H: Game Turn and Phase Markers: On the Game Turn Record Track place the GT markers. Place the Weather marker and the Player Turn markers on the Player Turn Track, and place the Victory Points marker on the Victory Points track. Use the front of the Victory Points markers when the Russians are ahead in VPs, and use the back when the Central Powers are ahead. Also, there are two Game Turn and Player Turn markers (again, double-sided) for use during team play to allow the two fronts to proceed at different rates.

I. Rail and Bridge Markers: Store any RR Line and Field Railway markers (17.5, 17.6 & 17.7) and Pontoon Bridge markers (18.0) that are available but not yet used near the Strategic Resources Tracks.

J. Charts: Place aside the Autumn charts until GT 28.

K. Concealment Markers: If using the optional Concealment rules (26.0), place all Dummy markers as per 26.1 & 26.2. Otherwise, place them aside.

> L. Other Markers: Place all other unused markers (numbers, MPs Expended, IPs, etc.) aside until needed during play. Any pontoon bridges not deployed at the beginning of a scenario are available for use during the scenario.

M. Other Info: Check for any other deployment information that may be listed with the selected scenario, below.

28.4 Withdrawals and Releases
Each scenario has a listing of the GTs that any units or formations are withdrawn or released. Each unit is classified as to which part of its nation’s grid it appears on so that you can determine its original setup location. (Note that while detachments are Asset Units, they are listed with their parent formations in the grid. Because of this, they are categorized as “Corps Units,” “Infantry Divisions,” or “Cavalry Divisions” so you can reference the correct section.)

28.5 Inactive Armies (Army Command Activation Rule)

> Some armies begin a scenario inactive. These armies are labeled “Inactive” in the set-up instructions. All subordinated formations and units attached to an inactive army may not expend movement points in any way until activated (see each nation’s “Withdrawals and Releases” section).

28.6 Points Table
The Railroad Engineer, Rail, and Replacement Points Table at the end of the setup grids lists the number of those points that are available each GT or Inter-Phase in the non-campaign scenarios. For the Campaign game, use the numbers listed on the Game Turn Record Track.

28.7 Off-Map Railroad Charts
Use these charts when moving units off-map according to 8.2.6.

29.0 SCENARIOS

29.1 Introductory Scenario—The First Battle of the Masurian Lakes

Historical Notes
In late August, while the Battle of Tannenberg raged to the south, the Russian First Army had advanced slowly but steadily across northern East Prussia. Vanguard cavalry units had reached the area of Wormditt and Allenstein. When Rennenkampf, the First Army’s commander, received word of the Second Army’s debacle he immediately called in the cavalry and took up positions between Taplau and Angerburg, a reinforced division masking the Lützen defile. Further south the newly arrived Tenth Army was just beginning to concentrate to cover the entrances to the southern Masurian Lakes.

The approaching German Eighth Army was at the height of its strength. The formations which forced marched from the Tannenberg battlefield were in high morale, and two new Corps with a cavalry division had arrived from France.

The German battle plan was to move two Corps and two Cavalry divisions through the Masurian Lake defilés to unhinge the First Army’s left flank and separate it from the Tenth Army. The rest of the Eighth Army was to launch a massive frontal assault on the First Army’s main line.

On September 7th the German forces struck out from the lake district, scattering the weak Russian second-line troops before them. By the 9th the German XVII and I Corps, with the 1st and 8th Cavalry divisions, were within 15 miles of Maggrabowa. The way for them to advance toward the Kovno-Stallupönen railroad line was clear. Hindenburg then made a grave error. Instead of ordering the corps turning Rennenkampf’s left flank to march on Wierzbolowo (Virbalis), he ordered them to turn sharply north toward Goldap. In the meantime the frontal attacks launched by the Germans to the north were generally a failure, although with minor tactical successes.
Under such immense pressure Rennenkampf recognized that he faced the entire Eighth Army and ordered a general retreat to avoid enencirclement and destruction. The Russian First Army began forced marching every unit to its maximum ability. Rennenkampf, relatively skillfully, was able to pull the First Army back to the Nieman River intact but much depleted.

29.1.1 Scenario Length
_The First Battle of the Masurian Lakes_ begins with the German Player Turn of GT 12 (roughly September 8) and ends after the completion of GT 16 (roughly September 19).

29.1.2 General Information
A. Map: Use only the North Map. The area of the map in play is all hex rows east of 62.xx inside Germany (exclusive) and all hex rows east of 49.xx inside Russia (exclusive).

B. Strategic plans: No Strategic plans are in play.

C. REPLs, RPs, and RR Engs:
• No Replacements are used in this scenario.
• No Rail Points are used in this scenario.
• No RR Engineer points are used in this scenario.

D. Railhead Markers:
• None needed—see 29.1.3b & c below.

29.1.3 First Masurian Special Rules
29.1.3a GT 12 Special Rules: Play begins with the German Player Turn (the Russian Player Turn is skipped).

29.1.3b Rail Movement: Only Depot units may use Rail Movement.

29.1.3c RR Engineers: All RR line hexes in friendly controlled territory are considered automatically “friendly operational.”

29.1.4 Withdrawals and Releases
None in this scenario.

29.1.5 Determining Victory
Victory is determined by the number of the following hexes controlled by the German player at the end of GT 16:
• Insterburg (48.19)
• Gumbinnen (44.20)
• Lyck (43.30)
• Suwalki (38.27)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Hexes Controlled</th>
<th>Type of Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Major German Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minor German Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 or 0</td>
<td>Russian Victory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29.2 The Battle for Lublin

Historical Notes
On August 23rd the Austro-Hungarian First and Fourth Armies debouched from the Tanew Woods and collided with the advancing Russian Fourth and Fifth Armies. The battle that lasted without interruption until September 9th has been named the Battle of Lublin. Initially Austro-Hungarian numbers prevailed in what became known as the “Battle of Krasnik” and forced the Russian Fourth Army to fall back and compress towards Lublin. The Russian High Command recognized the danger of losing touch with the Vistula River and immediately arranged a mass of reinforcements for the Fourth Army’s sector.

On August 26th the Russian Fifth Army joined the struggle. In the Krasnostaw area, the Russian 25th Corps succeeded in pushing forward as far as Zamosc (36.75) before being forced to withdraw on Krasnostaw (37.70). The other corps of the Russian Fifth Army attempted to advance toward Tomaszów and initially took parts of the Austrian Fourth Army in the flank, before themselves being flanked by the Austro-Hungarian XIV Corps that emerged in echelon from the south. Units of the Russian 19th, 5th and 17th Corps held positions in a semicircle round Komarow (34.76) and Laszczow (32.77) and, in spite of the Austro-Hungarian’s superiority, initially held firm. By August 30th the Austro-Hungarians emerged victorious when the Fifth Army began to retreat to the line Rejowiec (36.69) - Matce (29.71). The Austro-Hungarian’s named this clash the “Battle of Komarow.”

The Austro-Hungarian High Command interpreted the Russian Fifth Army’s retreat as a great victory and believed for all practical purposes that the Fifth Army had been destroyed. Unfortunately for the Austro-Hungarians, their optimistic interpretation did not match the facts, as they were to learn later in the battle.

Conrad v. Hötzendorf, the Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff, now made a critical decision. Realizing the superiority that the Russian forces held over his forces around Lemberg, he ordered the Fourth Army to turn about and advance southward into the flank of the Russian Third Army (that had occupied Lemberg on September 3rd). The pursuit of the defeated Fifth Army was left to the Armeegruppe of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.

At the same time as the Russian Fifth Army was being forced to retire, the situation of the Russian Fourth Army was critical. On September 1st the Austro-Hungarians were able to break through in the direction of Trawniki (39.68) creating a gap between the two Russian armies. On the following day reinforcements were sent to plug the hole and achieved a victory which marked the high tide of the Austro-Hungarian advance.

With the arrival of significant Russian reinforcements and the departure of the four Austro-Hungarian corps (even with the arrival of Kummer and Woyrsch) the balance of forces turned significantly in the Russian’s favor.

On September 4th, the day the Russian Ninth Army was formed, the Russians went on the offensive along the whole front. On the Russian Fourth Army’s front particularly intense battles raged on the 6th, 7th and 8th forcing the Austro-Hungarian First Army to refuse its right flank. By September 9th Dankl, the First Army’s Commander, was forced to concede defeat and began to retreat.

As the Russian Fifth Army assumed the offensive it quickly overwhelmed what was left of its opponent’s forces, routing the Archduke’s Armeegruppe. The 25th Corps advanced into a gap
between the Austro-Hungarian First and Fourth Armies contributing to the First Army’s defeat. The other corps vigorously advanced in the direction of Tomaszów (35.78), reaching the town on September 9th. The issue had been decided, the Battle of Lublin was a clear Russian victory (the Austro-Hungarian retreat did not end until reaching the Dunejea River).

29.2.1 Scenario Length
The Battle for Lublin is 9 GTs long and begins on August 23 (GT 4) and ends September 10 (GT 12).

29.2.2 General Information
A. Map: Only the Center Map is used for play; use only hexes found south of hexrow xx.55 (exclusive) and between the rivers Vistula and Bug (i.e. east of the Vistula, west of the Bug). Only full hexes are in play; do not use half-hexes. Exception: The Russian FIFTH Army Major Depot unit begins outside the boundaries.

B. Strategic Plans: The A-H and Russian SW Front Strategic plans covered in 21.5 and 21.6 respectively are in play with the following modification. The Russian Operational Objectives are:

| FOURTH Army | Hexes 44.80 and 38.80 |
| FIFTH Army  | Hexes 38.80 and 30.80 |

C. REPLs, RPs, and RR Engs:
- See the Points table for the number of Replacement Points received.
- No Rail Points are used in this scenario, and see 29.2.3b below.
- Neither side receives any RR Engineers during the scenario. All RR lines in friendly controlled territory are friendly operational. This includes any RR hexes captured during play.

PLAY NOTE: Do not skip the RR Engineering Phase. The Austro-Hungarian player begins the scenario with two deployed Field Railways (see 17.5).

D. Railheads: None in this scenario.

29.2.3 Battle for Lublin Special Rules:
29.2.3a GT 4 Russian Forced march: No Russian unit may conduct a Forced march during the Russian Movement phase of GT 4.

29.2.3b Rail Movement: Only supply units and reinforcements arriving in Rail Mode can use Rail Movement.

29.2.3c Special A-H Supply Sources: Until the arrival of the FOURTH Army’s Major Depot unit on map on GT 5, all A-H units attached to the FOURTH Army can trace supply and draw AP from any south map edge hexes between hexes 30.80 and 40.80. Consider any such hex to contain the Major Depot unit. Once on map the Major and Minor Depot units are considered to always be “In-Supply.”

The FOURTH Army Organizational Display is available at the start of the scenario even though its Major Depot is not in play yet.

29.2.3d South Map edge hexes: No Russian unit may enter a southern map edge hex.

29.2.4 Withdrawals and Releases
A. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN:

GT 9
WITHDRAW:
Corps Units: 25/2; 27/6, 39/6, 15/6, Train/6; 19/17, 2m/17, 9m/17, Train/17

Infantry Division: 41
Cavalry Division: 6c

>> PLAY NOTE: The A-H player must withdraw these units on GT 9. Simply remove the units from the map.

29.2.5 Determining Victory
The Austro-Hungarian player wins if he holds Lublin at the end of the scenario. If he does not, the Russian player wins.

PLAY NOTE: This is an introductory scenario designed to teach gamers how to play the system and to illustrate the need for pushing their troops to the very edge to satisfy the demands of their Strategic Plans.

29.3 The Great Battle for Galicia

Historical Notes
There are not many good accounts about the 1914 Battle for Galicia written in English. The following notes are an abridged version of Golovine’s “The Great Battle of Galicia” published in The Slavonic Review, Vol.5 1926-27.

The Russian forces that were intended to operate against Austria-Hungary formed the four armies of the South-West Front. The G.O.C. of the Front was General Ivanov, and his Chief of Staff, General Alexeyev. The composition of the armies during the first period (up to 30 August) is given in the following table, and the concentration points in fig. No. 1 (page 6):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Army</th>
<th>G.O.C. Army</th>
<th>Army Corps</th>
<th>No. of Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grenadiers, XIV, XVI</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>General Baron Saltz, afterwards General Ewarth</td>
<td></td>
<td>61/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>General Plehve V, XVII, XIX, XXV</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>General Ruzsky IX, XI, XXI</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>General Brusilov VII, VIII, XII, XXIV</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>381/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>171/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Russian campaign plan provided for an immediate general offensive, without waiting for the arrival of belated troops from the interior of the country. This was a striking expression of the strategical fallacy then in vogue in the general staffs of Russia and France that the offensive was the only way of conducting war. The result was the decision to attack the armies of the Central Powers at all points, without waiting for the complete concentration of the Russian forces. The task detailed to the armies of the South-West Front was “to defeat the Austro-Hungarian armies, with a view to preventing the retreat of any considerable number of the enemy southwards, over the Dniester, or westwards, towards Krakau (71.81).” Thus we see that the plan made a maximum demand on the South-West Front. The task was not only to rout, but to surround the Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia.

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Military historical experience shows that for an operation of this kind to be successful, either an immense superiority in quality or technique is needed, or a considerable superiority of numbers. The Russian planners had no grounds, before the war, to count on any enormous superiority of quality or technique of the Russian over the Austro-Hungarian army. So there was only one way out—to secure a great superiority of numbers. Meanwhile, according to the Russian General Staff’s own calculation, Austria-Hungary by the fifteenth day of mobilization would concentrate in Galicia from 43 to 47 divisions of infantry. It is evident that the task allotted to the South-West Front did not correspond with the relative forces of the opposing sides.

The disproportion of forces to tasks was a characteristic feature of the Russian and French plans of campaign. This defect was already apparent in the strategical deployment of the South-West Front, which presented a “cordon” 450 km. long. The chief striking wing was the right, as the main lines of communication of the Austro-Hungarian armies concentrated in Galicia went westwards, to Krakau; besides, the operative union of the Austro-Hungarians with the Germans was most easily achieved along the routes going westwards. Meanwhile, the above table shows that the right flank of the Russian Army, the 4th, was precisely the weakest.

In 1909-12 Russian secret intelligence had succeeded in obtaining documentary data concerning the points of concentration proposed by the Austro-Hungarian plan of campaign. These documents indicated that all the forces detailed against Russia were to be deployed east of the San (51.74–41.87). The possession of this information tempted the Russian Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, and his colleagues, to draw up his plan so as to aim all the armies of the South-West Front on a concentric offensive against Lvov (Lemberg). This plan was a bad one, for Sukhomlinov had no grounds whatsoever to suppose that the initiative would remain in the hands of the Russians; the Austro-Hungarians would be ready first, and would thus have the “choice of the field of battle”. Besides, the Austro-Hungarian General Staff might change the points of concentration; and then the Russian plan would fall flat.

So, indeed, it turned out. In the summer of 1914 the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, General Conrad von Hötzendorn, foreseeing a war with Serbia, made considerable changes in the plan of deployment of his armies. Intending to begin his operations by a decisive offensive in a northern direction between the San and the Bug (60.49–25.82), he concentrated the main mass of the Austro-Hungarian forces along the San—that is to say, much further west than the Russians expected. These were the 1st and 4th Armies. To cover them from the Russians advancing from Dubno (11.79), the 3rd Army was located about Lwow and Sambor (38.91). The Army Group Kövesz (parts of the 2nd Army) was deployed still further east, with the task of covering the deeper rear from the Russians advancing from Proskurov (offmap via 01.91) and further south. Finally, to secure the left wing of the main forces at Krakau, was to be assembled the Army Group of General Kummer. His task was to form an operative link with the German corps of General Woyrsch, who was advancing from Posen (98.47) in the direction of the Vistula.

The composition of the Austro-Hungarian armies in the first period of the battle of Galicia is shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Group</th>
<th>G.O.C. Army</th>
<th>Army Corps</th>
<th>No. of Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Group</td>
<td>General Kummer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>General Dankl</td>
<td>I, V, X</td>
<td>10 1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>General Auffenberg</td>
<td>II, VI, XVII</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>General Brudermann</td>
<td>III, XI, XIV</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Group</td>
<td>General Kövesz</td>
<td>XII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 39 1/2 9

This table shows that the Austro-Hungarian forces were somewhat inferior to what had been expected by the Russian General Staff. The reason for this was the war with Serbia, which also caused a delay of several days in the concentration in Galicia. Thus the conditions turned out to be more favorable for the Russian Command than had been presumed in the Russian plan of campaign. But the advantage was not sufficient to ensure the fulfillment of the enormous task assigned by this plan to the South-West Front.

A comparison of the new grouping of the Austro-Hungarian armies with the Russian forces facing them comes out as very disadvantageous to the Russians. In the first place it becomes strikingly apparent that the concentric maneuver against Lvov, fixed by Sukhomlinov’s plan, would be a blow into a void for three Armies (5th, 3rd and 8th) while the weakest of the four, the 4th Army, on the right, was exposed to the full shock of the main mass of the Austro-Hungarian forces. This main mass consisted at the outset of the 1st and 4th Armies; but in the course of their advance on a front of 150 km. between the Vistula and the Bug, they could be strengthened by the addition, on the right, of a part of the 3rd Army (viz., the group of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, concentrated at Sambor), and on the left by that of the group of General Kummer, to say nothing of the German Corps of Woyrsch (two divisions) which might also be drawn closer. Thus the Austro-Hungarians were prepared to concentrate for operations on the chief sector of their front, 26 Austrian and two German divisions, making an average of one division to each 6 km. of front.

The Russian strategic deployment extended over 450 km. The 4th and 5th Armies formed as it were a Northern Group with a front of 175 km.; the 3rd and 8th, which were to advance from the East, deployed on a front of 200 km. Between the flanks of the 3rd and...
5th Armies, in their initial positions, there was left a gap of 75 km, which was gradually to diminish in the course of the concentric advance on Lvov. But, as has been pointed out, the fact of the Austro-Hungarian armies being ready at an earlier date secured them the initiative of operations, and consequently the choice of ground for the decisive battle. General v. Hötzendörfer proposed to fight it north of the Tanew Woods (50.74–43.76); there, on the roads to Lublin (43.66) and Chelm (34.69), the main forces of the Austro-Hungarians were to meet the 16 1/2 infantry divisions of the 4th and 5th Armies, scattered over a front of 175 km. The chances of success of the Austro-Hungarian armies were greatly increased by the fact that the Russian plan of campaign exposed the right flank of the 4th Army to the attack of the enemy.

It was a hard legacy that the Grand Duke Nicholas and General Ivanov received from Sukhomlinov. In order to lessen the gap between the 8th and 3rd Armies on the one side, and the 4th and 5th on the other, General Ivanov ordered the first two to begin their advance a little before the other two, viz. 8th Army, 19 August; 3rd, 20 August; 4th and 5th, on the 23 August. This delay saved the 4th and 5th Armies from disaster, but did not prevent the initial discomfort of the 4th Army. Only by 22 August did the Russian Staffs become aware of the fact that the Austro-Hungarian concentration had taken place much further west than had been supposed by the plan of campaign. On 23 August, General Alexeyev sent instructions changing the direction of the march-route of the 4th and 5th Armies. They were instructed to swing round their lefts, and advance towards the San by a frontal movement, having the right flank along the Vistula.

No doubt these orders warded off the enemy’s blow in the flank, resulting, as they did, in a frontal clash with the main Austro-Hungarian forces. But the change was too late.

On 23 August the 1st and 4th Austro-Hungarian Armies debouched from the Tanew Woods. In consequence of the flanking position of the 1st and 4th Austro-Hungarian armies in respect of the Russian 4th and 5th, the action to the north of the Tanew Woods did not begin at the same time along the whole line, but was engaged at first on the right of the Russian 4th Army, spreading afterwards to its whole front. The struggle on the front of the 4th Army lasted without interruption until 9 September. These engagements on the front of the 4th Army have been named the Battle of Lublin.

The result of the first days of the battle was predetermined by the great superiority of numbers of the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army over the 4th Russian Army (10 divisions against 6 1/2), and especially by the former’s advantageous flanking position. The right flank army corps of the Russian 4th Army (XIV) was at once thrown into confusion and began to retreat on Lublin, losing touch with the Vistula. The gap was filled by the cavalry of Prince Tumanov, which up to the arrival of the XVIII Army Corps (30 August) frustrated all attempts of the Austro-Hungarians to break through between Lublin and Ivangoerd (30.62) for a deep turning movement of the Russian right. Having routed the right wing of the Russian 4th Army, General Dankl launched a vigorous offensive, against its centre and left flank, which were forced on to the defensive. The reverse on the right wing and its initial scattered disposition compelled the 4th Army, in retiring, to compress towards Lublin. This increased the distance between it and the 5th Army, and made it easier for the Austro-Hungarians to break through between the Russian armies in the direction of Trawniki (39.68) and Krasnostaw (37.70).

From the outset the G.O.C. 4th Army began to request the Staff of the Front to strengthen his right, and that he should receive support from the 5th Army. But the position of the latter was made difficult by there being already a big gap between its left wing and the right wing of the 3rd Army, which every movement westwards would increase.

On the evening of 23 August the 5th Army was located in two groups: a left group of three army corps (XIX, V, XVII) on the Bug between Hrubieszów [30.64] and Vladimir-Volynsk [25.72], and a right group of one corps (XXV) in the direction of Krasnostaw. The latter’s task was to assure the operative union with the left wing of the 4th Army. Immediately on receiving the request for help of his left-hand neighbor, General Plevye gave orders to the XXV Corps to actively co-operate with the left of the 4th Army, and at the same time to detail off one brigade of infantry to Lublin, to be at the disposal of G.O.C., 4th Army.

The Headquarters of the South-West Front (as we have seen) had been too late in their first attempt to counteract the errors of the campaign plan, but at this juncture it acted with great rapidity. As early as 24 August, i.e., on the first news of the defeat of the XIV Army Corps, it gave the order to the 5th Army “to deal a blow against the flank and rear of the army’s forces that are attacking the 4th Army, and that have appeared in the direction of Tomaszów [35.78]–Zamosc [36.75].” With this as the objective, it was ordered, “while keeping back the right wing of the army north of Zamosc, and, while giving assistance to the army of General Saltz (4th) with a part of its forces, to place the remaining corps in echelon from the right on the line Tyszczewce (32.76) – Laszczów (32.77) – Sokal (26.78), in order then to attack the enemy in his right flank and rear.” In this decision it is impossible not to recognize the fine idea of helping the 4th Army by a maneuver of the whole neighboring 5th Army. As this flanking movement of the 5th Army would result in its displacement further west, it became imperative to bring the 3rd Army nearer. So, on 24 August, the 3rd Army was ordered to extend its right wing to Mosty-Wielkie (28.81). On the 25th the order was confirmed, and the explanation was given that this displacement of the 3rd Army northwards was intended to make it form a common front with the 4th and 5th Armies, in view of subsequent operations towards the San.

At the same time the 4th Army was ordered to desperately defend the positions now occupied by it; as to the strengthening of its right wing, General Headquarters were directing hither the XVIII and III Caucasian Army Corps, which were arriving by rail.

Thus can be seen that Generals Ivanov and Alexeyev at once understood that the initiative had been seized by the enemy, the decision of the whole operation lay in the outcome of the battle that was being engaged north of the Tanew Woods on the roads to Lublin and Cholm. The Russian battle plan, then, was conceived as follows: the 4th Army was to hold the enemy back south of Lublin; the 5th Army was to turn the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian main forces, advancing on Lublin and Cholm; the 3rd Army was to turn the same wing by a deeper enveloping movement; the 8th Army was to move in echelons behind the left wing of the 3rd, thus covering it. The plan answered perfectly to the circumstances.

On the same days, 23-24 August, General Conrad v. Hötzendörfer took measures to concentrate his forces on the “field of battle” north of the Tanew Woods. To this end he drew the troops of Group Kummer nearer to the left, and those of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand (4

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2 The Grand Duke had been ever since 1908 deprived of any part in the preparation of the plan of campaign; his appointment as Commander-in-Chief took place on the second day of the war, and contrary to previous intentions.
but it is desirable that the 3rd Army should draw closer as soon as possible."

We shall fight to the last extremity" he reported to General Ivanov with his other corps he decided to continue the unequal struggle.

Krasnostaw. General Plehve gave the order to recapture that town; and in spite of the enemy's almost twofold superiority of numbers positions in a semicircle round Komarow (34.76) and Laszczow, resistance. Units of the XIX, V and XVII Army Corps occupied to hold their positions and called on them to put up an obstinate

In spite of this, General Plehve ordered the corps on his left wing his position in echelon behind the right wing of Auffenberg's army. Army Group Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, who had emerged from by superior forces of the enemy. These were the four divisions of the Army of General Auffenberg. One of the latter (29.83), was to cover it from being enveloped by the Russians from Vladimir-Volynski. General Brudermann, with the remainder of the 3rd Army, received the order to advance to meet the Russians advancing from Dubno, so as to cover more widely the right flank of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. The Army Group Kövesz was ordered to continue covering the right from the Russians advancing from Prosкуров.

If the plans and groupings contemplated by both sides are compared, one can see that both, by means of echelons, were endeavoring to turn the eastern flanks of the forces fighting on the “field of battle” north of the Tanew Woods. It must be conceded that both High Commands displayed a profound understanding of the situation in directing their extreme echelons through the region of Rawa-Ruska (33.81) (the group of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was to move via Zölkiew; the right wing of the Russian 3rd Army via Mosty-Wielkie).

The Russian 4th Army, after falling back and compressing towards Lublin, carried on an obstinate fight with the advancing army of Dankl. On 26 August the 5th Army joined the struggle. The engagement on its front fell into two sections: (a) towards Krasnostaw, and (b) towards Tomaszów.

In the Krasnostaw area, the XXV Army Corps found itself forced to fight on a front of over 30 km., being forced on the one hand to support the left of the 4th Army, which was constantly falling back, and on the other to maintain fighting contact with the other corps of the 5th Army that were advancing in the direction of Tomaszów. The XXV Army Corps had to face the right wing divisions of the X, and the left wing divisions of the II Austro-Hungarian Army Corps. It succeeded in pushing its front as far as Zamosc (36.75). But the pressure of superior numbers of the enemy and the retreat of the left wing of the 4th Army obliged the XXV Army Corps to withdraw on Krasnostaw.

The army corps advancing toward Tomaszów engaged in battle in succession (beginning with the XIX Army Corps on the right wing) as they emerged successively from behind the left wing of their neighbors. This resulted in seven Russian divisions engaging with eight divisions of the Army of General Auffenberg. One of the latter (15th Honvéd) was utterly routed and taken prisoner near Laszczow by the gallant troops of the Russian V Army Corps, which came up in its rear. But at the same time the XVII Corps on the left wing of the 5th Army was defeated. It was attacked in the flank and rear by superior forces of the enemy. These were the four divisions of Army Group Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, who had emerged from his position in echelon behind the right wing of Auffenberg’s army. In spite of this, General Plehve ordered the corps on his left wing to hold their positions and called on them to put up an obstinate resistance. Units of the XIX, V and XVII Army Corps occupied positions in a semicircle round Komarow (34.76) and Laszczow, and in spite of the enemy’s almost twofold superiority of numbers (12 divisions against 7) repulsed his frontal attacks, as well as his attempt to turn both their flanks.

On 30 August the XXV Army Corps was forced to retreat from Krasnostaw. General Plehve gave the order to recapture that town; with his other corps he decided to continue the unequal struggle. “We shall fight to the last extremity” he reported to General Ivanov “but it is desirable that the 3rd Army should draw closer as soon as possible.”

But the 3rd Army did not draw closer, and on 31 August General Plehve, in accordance with the directions of Headquarters of the South-West Front, gave the order to his army to retreat to the line Krasnostaw - Vladimir-Volynski.

Thus after six days, ended the heroic fight of the left wing corps of the Russian 5th Army. The Austro-Hungarian Command named these actions “the victory of Komarow,” and attributed General Plehve’s retreat to the complete defeat of his army. However, the Austro-Hungarian’s optimistic interpretation of their success did not correspond to the facts; and, as one shall see later on, General Auffenberg was destined before long to learn by experience whether General Plehve’s army was really routed.

What, then, was happening all this time to the Russian 3rd Army? How was it that the group of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had managed to advance northwards unhindered, and why did not G.O.C. 3rd Army, General Ruzsky, give any support to his neighbor, General Plehve, during the latter’s titanic struggle?

The 3rd and 8th Armies had begun their movement in the directions prescribed by the plan of campaign: the former on Lvov, the latter further south. At all points they forced the covering troops of the enemy to recede. On 26, 27, and 28 August, there was hard fighting round Zloczów (20.87) and on the Zlota Lipa, due to the forward movement of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army of General Brudermann, supported by General Kövesz. As we have said, General v. Hötzendorf had ordered General Brudermann to gain room towards the east, so as to cover the maneuver of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand against the Russian 5th Army. In the actions round Zloczów and on the Zlota Lipa, the Russians had a large superiority of numbers (22 Russian infantry divisions against 13 Austro-Hungarian). These engagements ended in victory for the Russians. But the strategic result was not proportional to the measure of the tactical success. General Ruzsky, in spite of General Ivanov’s orders to transfer the centre of gravity of his operations further north, obstinately continued to press straight on to Lvov. This may be seen, if one examines the grouping of his forces in the battle of Zloczów. He conducted this action as though it were a perfectly independent operation, without any connection with the battle that at the same time was turning to the Russian’s disadvantage north of the Tanew Woods. He limited himself to a slight outflanking of Brudermann’s left, while the Higher Command demanded of him a much more considerable forward movement to the north, into the gap between the 3rd and 4th Austro-Hungarian Armies. The G.O.C. 3rd Army so far misunderstood the situation that, instead of having his cavalry in front of his right wing, he kept it all on his left. Meanwhile, on 26 August, General Ivanov confirmed to General Ruzsky his orders of the 24th and 25th, to the effect that he should transfer the 3rd Army to the front Mosty-Wielkie - Kurowice, explaining this time that the transfer was called for by the necessity of forming a continuous front of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies for subsequent action in the direction of the San. How well this demand answered to the goal can be gathered from the fact that Austro-Hungarian sources speak of the anxiety with which the Austrians kept looking towards Mosty-Wielkie, where they had sent all their available cavalry as a covering force. If the Russians had there emerged on the flank of the group of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, it must have had serious results.

On 28 August General Ivanov repeated his order: “At once to transfer the Army to the right; this is dictated by the situation of the 4th and 5th Armies.” But General Ruzsky continued to take no notice of the Commander-in-Chief’s orders; he kept his right within one day’s march of the road to Lvov. His attention was wholly absorbed by the capital of Galicia, and by the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army,
which had now assumed the offensive. Thus General Brudermann, though tactically defeated, was strategically successful, as he kept Ruzsky from turning northward.

How far the staff of the 3rd Army misunderstood the general situation becomes evident from the following fact: On 28 August, after the battle of Zloczów, it decided to hold up its advance for 2-3 days, in order to reposition the position before Lvov and to await drafts and supplies. Knowing as we now do the whole development of the battle of Galicia, it may be safely said that it would have been lost by the Russians if this delay had actually taken place.

How then is to be explained the obstinate disobedience of the 3rd Army G.O.C.? In one of the issues of the Voenny Sbornik (Military Collection), published in Belgrade (No. 2, 1922), the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army, General V. M. Dragomirov, gives his explanations. From them it appears that the staff of the 3rd Army was not in agreement with the instructions of General Ivanov. So they considered themselves entitled not to obey them, and to act according to their own considerations. “But the realization of these considerations,” writes General Dragomirov, “met with resistance on the part of the Higher Command, which under the impression of the critical situation of the neighboring armies, demanded our immediate support of the army next to us. The G.O.C. 3rd Army had to compromise, and even directly to disobey instructions from above, but still he [Ruzsky] did not give up the objective which he had set himself.”

In the same article General Dragomirov formulates his objectives in the following way: “to endeavor to destroy the screen left by the Austro-Hungarians in front of our 3rd and 8th Armies.” The chief consideration, however, was that the Battle for Galicia was being fought on a front of several armies, so that even such apparently attractive tasks as the complete destruction of opposing forces by one of the armies led to a general victory only if this success was obtained on the principal line of operations. Otherwise, even a considerable local success on a secondary line would be ineffective. That General Alexeyev (who inspired General Ivanov in his orders to the 3rd Army) was governed by these considerations, is shown by his telegram to the Staff of the 3rd Army of 2 September. The telegram says: “At the present moment the outcome of the first period of the campaign does not depend on your operations against Lvov and the Dniester, but on the issue of the battle on the front Lublin - Kholm - Hrubieszów. Even the taking of Lvov would not compensate us for the loss of the battle in the north.”

Events proved to what an extent General Alexeyev’s point of view was correct, and that of the staff of the 3rd Army wrong. But while the Battle of Galicia was in progress, General Ivanov had to deal with a subordinate command which thought it understood things better, and declined to obey. The conflict with the 3rd Army went so far that on 29 August, General Ivanov, in repeating his demand that the centre of operations of that army should be transferred to the north of Lvov, found himself obliged to remind General Ruzsky of discipline. “It is my business,” he telegraphed, “to fix the tasks of the individual armies.”

On 30 August the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters informed Generals Ivanov and Alexeyev that the Guard Corps was being directed to the South-West Front, and at the same time stated that the Grand Duke had not hesitated to sacrifice all his original intentions in order to secure a complete success over the Austrians. This decision of the Grand Duke was the most important in the strategic direction on the Russian theatre. It meant the abandonment of the scattering of forces on three lines of operations, as imposed by the plan of campaign. Now the South-West Front became really the chief front.

In consequence of the considerable reinforcement of the 4th Army, the troops that formed the right wing of the South-West Front were, on 4 September, divided into two armies, 4th and 9th. The latter, under the command of General Lechitsky, was formed of the XIV Corps, on the right wing of the 4th Army, and of the XVIII Corps, which had arrived on 30 August; together with the Guards Rifle Brigade.

The Russian troops that took part in the second period of the battle of Galicia (after 30 August) is shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Army</th>
<th>G.O.C. Army</th>
<th>Army Corps</th>
<th>No. of Divisions Infantry Cavalry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>Lt. General Lechitsky</td>
<td>XVIII, XIV</td>
<td>7 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>General Ewarth</td>
<td>Guards, XVI, Grenadiers, III, Caucasian</td>
<td>10 21/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>General Plehve</td>
<td>V, XVII, XIX, XV</td>
<td>10 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>General Ruzsky</td>
<td>IX, X, XI, XXI</td>
<td>12 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>Gen. Brusilov</td>
<td>VII, VIII, XII</td>
<td>10 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49 191/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that the Russian troops north of the Tanew Woods had increased from 16 1/2 to 27 divisions. The total number of infantry divisions concentrated here by the enemy was, we have seen, 28. Thus on this most important sector of the battlefront, with the arrival of reinforcements, equality of numbers was reached.

The Commander-in-Chief did not limit himself to this. Having decided to force a victory on the South-West Front, he called on the armies of that front for the greatest effort obtainable.

On the same day that it became known to General Headquarters that after his success at Zloczów General Ruzsky intended to suspend his operations, the Grand Duke issued the following “categorical” order: “General Ruzsky’s delay, whatever its causes is recognized as entirely inadmissible, as it gives the enemy a breathing space, and will allow him to transfer forces from Lvov to the north. General Ruzsky must hold the enemy before him by the throat, pressing him incessantly, and developing turning movements with his right wing to the north of Lvov.”

This intervention of the Grand Duke proved all the more necessary, as General Ivanov, apparently worn out by the obstinate resistance of the G.O.C. 3rd Army, had given way, and, though it is true with reservations, had agreed to the halt of this army. Thus the faltering will of the Front’s G.O.C. was at the critical moment propped up by the will of the Commander-in-Chief.

On 31 August the Staff of the South-West Front received the following order of the Grand Duke: “In view of a great check in the 2nd Army, and of the necessity of finishing with the Austrians before the arrival from the west of German reinforcements, the Commander-in-Chief has ordered the Armies of the South-West Front to pass to the most decisive action against the Austrians on the whole of your front, expressing his firm will that the forces of General Ewarth and Lechitsky should advance wherever possible in the most determined way, so as to crush the enemy. In those sectors where the situation

3 The Army of General Samsonov. G.H.Q. had just received the news of the disaster of that army at Tannenberg.
renders an offensive impossible, the troops must hold their positions to the last man.”

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This order of the Grand Duke was simultaneous with the beginning of the retreat of the 5th Army to the line Krasnostaw - Vladimir-Volynski. The idea expressed in it was the best means of supporting the centre, which was beginning to give way, by means of an increased pressure on the wings (right wing, 4th Army, later, 9th and 4th; left wing, 3rd and 8th Armies). But just at this moment the situation of the left wing of the 4th Army became critical. On 1 September considerable forces of the Austrian X Corps broke through in the direction of Trawniki. Added to the retreat, on the day before, of the XXV Corps on the right wing of the 5th Army from Krasnostaw, this reverse produced a serious gap between the 4th and 5th Armies; this compelled the G.O.C. 4th Army, General Ewarth, to send all reinforcements, as they arrived to fill this gap. On the following day this was achieved: an amalgamated group formed of various units of the Guards and the III Caucasian Army Corps, immediately on its detrainment, won a brilliant success at Suchodol (40.69). But the immediate effect of the break-through of the Austrians was the detrainment of the Guards and of the III Caucasian Army Corps on the left instead of to the right of the 4th Army. Thus, on the right of the South-West Front arose a strategical grouping which made it inevitable that the striking wing would be the inner (i.e., the left wing of the 4th Army) and not the outer wing.

On the Russian left wing (3rd and 8th Army) the impulse given by the Grand Duke took form earlier. The double superiority of numbers enabled the Russians to continue, without loss of time, a decisive offensive. On 29 and 30 August the Russian troops again won a brilliant success on the Gnila Lipa (27.90–26.93). But General Ruszky, in whose hands was the operative control of both the left wing armies, still did not carry out the ideas of Generals Ivanov and Alexeyev. His attention remained riveted on the enemy immediately in front of him, and the capital of Galicia, Lvov, which lay behind the enemy forces.

As to the movements of the centre (i.e., the 5th Army), the Grand Duke’s orders had the following sequel: General Alexeyev, informing General Plehve of the offensive of all the other armies of the Front, instructed him, in case of a relaxation of the enemy’s pressure, to take the offensive at once.

On 3 September, after the report of the taking of Lvov had arrived, the separate instructions issued by the Staff of the Front in execution of the Grand Duke’s order of 31 August were summarized in a general order. The order contained the fundamental idea which was expressed in General Ivanov’s instruction of 24 August, namely, the outflanking and envelopment of the eastern flank of the Austro-Hungarian forces operating near Lublin. The attack on this flank of the enemy was to be carried out by the troops (Guards and III Caucasian Army Corps) concentrated on the left wing of the 4th Army. The nearer outflanking of this side of the enemy was assigned to the 5th Army, which was to assume the offensive in the general direction of Szczezbrzeszyn (39.74). Finally, the envelopment of that flank of the enemy was to be carried out by the 3rd Army, which was to be directed on the front Bilgoraj (42.77) - Jaroslaw (43.84). The 8th Army was to cover the left flank of the 3rd Army.

The advance of the 3rd Army on the front Bilgoraj - Jaroslaw would bring it towards Rawa-Ruska, the very point at which, ever since 24 August, General Alexeyev had fruitlessly tried to bring out the right wing of the army. The direction of the 3rd Army on Rawa-Ruska had another important operative effect: the gap between the 3rd and 5th Armies was diminished, and this made possible that co-operation of the two which General Alexeyev had all the time been trying to achieve.

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While the battle plan for Galicia was crystallizing at the Russian General Headquarters, and at the Headquarters of the South-West Front, the Austro-Hungarian General Headquarters was also making decisions of prime importance. General Conrad v. Hötzenzord began to realize the enormous superiority of the Russian forces advancing from Dubno and Proskurov. But the battles round Komarow, ending in the retreat of Plehve northward, were taken by the Austro-Hungarians to be a great victory. General v. Hötzenzord decided to withdraw the 3rd Army of Boroevic (who had replaced Brudermann) and the Group Kövesz to two or three marches behind the River Wereszyca (32.87–32.91) and to the Gródek (33.87) positions, abandoning Lvov without a fight. Reinforcements arriving from Serbia were directed to the right wing of this new front, thus transforming Group Kövesz into the 2nd Army of General Boehm-Ermolli. The 4th Army (of Auffenberg) was to leave the pursuit of the defeated army of Plehve to Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and swing round at right angles on Rawa-Ruska in order to attack the flank of the Russian forces advancing from Lvov. Simultaneously with the advance of Auffenberg, the 3rd and 2nd Armies were to take the offensive with vigor, the latter receiving the task of turning the left of the advancing Russians.

In accordance with the new decisions of General v. Hötzenzord and taking into account the arrival of reinforcements, the Austro-Hungarian forces were distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of G.O.C. Army</th>
<th>Army Corps</th>
<th>No. of Divisions Infantry Cavalry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st General Dankl</td>
<td>I, V, X, Kummer, Woyrsch</td>
<td>15 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand</td>
<td>XIV</td>
<td>4 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th General Auffenberg</td>
<td>II, VI, XVII, IX</td>
<td>9 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd General Boroevic</td>
<td>III, XI</td>
<td>7½ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd General Boehm-Ermolli</td>
<td>IV, VII, XII</td>
<td>11 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>46½ 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the new distribution of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian forces, we find north of the Tanew Woods 19 Austro-Hungarian divisions opposed to 27 Russian; on the front Rawa-Ruska - Gródek - Wereszyca 27 ½ Austro-Hungarian divisions opposed to 22 Russian.

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On 4 September, the very day of its “new” formation, the Russian 9th Army began a vigorous offensive. Compressed, as it was on its right by the Vistula, it had no choice but to make a frontal advance. In spite of successful attacks, on this and the following days, the advance was slow, and the action consisted of pushing out the enemy from obstinately defended positions.

The right wing of the 4th Army was in the same position. Its left wing vigorously drove home its success of 2 September at Suchodol, and forced Dankl’s Army to refuse its right wing. On the front Koszarzew - Wysokie (42.72), a particularly hot action took place on 6, 7 and 8 September. Fearing the further development of the Russian turning
movement, General Dankl reinforced the Austro-Hungarian units with the German Corps Woyrsch. Only on 9 September did the combined efforts of the Guards, Grenadiers and III Caucasian Corps succeed in breaking the resistance of Dankl’s right, and in starting the enveloping movement. To this victory contributed the appearance of the two right wing Army Corps of the 5th Army (XXV and XIX) near Turobin (41.72) and Szczezbrzeszyn, which constituted a menace to Dankl’s rear.

The reverse on his right wing forced General Dankl to begin to retreat his entire front. The battle of Lublin, which had lasted 18 days, after beginning unluckily for the Russians, ended fortuitously for them, and this decided the Russians success over the whole battlefield of Galicia.

The 5th Army, which assumed the offensive on 4 September, again occupied Krasnostaw with its right wing (XXV Corps), and then, constantly threatening to turn Dankl’s right, seconded the advance of the left wing of the Russian 4th Army. The other Corps of Plehve’s Army routed the group of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, which was still in front of them; after which, the V and XVII Corps vigorously developed their success in the direction of Tomaszów, reaching that town on 9 September, while the XIX Corps moved on Szczezbrzeszyn, to cooperate with the XXV Corps against Dankl’s rear.

As soon as the victorious issue of the battle of Lublin became clear, General Ivanov ordered the 9th and 4th Armies to pursue the enemy with energy. The G.O.C. 5th Army, was instructed “not to allow his two right wing Army Corps to go too far forward north-west, as their destination should be a strong offensive on the front Janów (45.74) - Bilgoraj, leaving it to the troops of General Ewarth to drive the enemy off from the routes leading to the San, and to press him on to the Vistula, where he is to be met by General Lechitsky’s Cavalry. Eventually these two Army Corps will have to operate in a southerly direction.” Thus was planned the appearance of the whole of Plehve’s Army in the rear of the Austro-Hungarian Armies concentrated about Rawa-Ruska and on the Gródek positions. This threatened General v. Hötzendorf with utter disaster on his eastern front.

While the last of the battle of Lublin was being played out, hard fighting had begun between the armies of Ruzsky and Auffenberg. Now at last the Russian 3rd Army had observed the orders of General Ivanov, and turned in the direction of Rawa-Ruska. Thus the Austro-Hungarian maneuver to attack the flank of the Russians by Rawa-Ruska was turned into a frontal attack.

In the battle of Rawa-Ruska there was a frontal clash of 9 Russian divisions against 9 Austro-Hungarian. But besides these, General Ruzsky had three divisions of the XXI Corps, moving in echelon in front of the right wing of the 3rd Army. The XXI Corps came out on the rear of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and helped Plehve to rout that group. After this, it turned Auffenberg’s left, while beyond its right the XXV and V Corps of Plehve’s Army came forward in echelon.

At the same time an engagement took place along the whole front of the Russian 8th Army, which was attacked by the 3rd and 2nd Austro-Hungarian Armies. General Brusilov’s 10 divisions had to support the pressure of the enemy’s 18. Brusilov’s situation became difficult. On 9 September, after hard fighting with far superior numbers of the enemy, the left corps of the 8th Army was forced to fall back. This caused a general retirement of the rest of this army. However, the Russian troops fought obstinately, defending every height or wood. But the victory won by the Russian 9th, 4th and 5th Armies over Dankl began to take effect. The fundamental law of strategy which lays down that ultimate success falls to the side which has been successful at the decisive place, once again came true. For a moment the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters entertained a hope of making good progress by a success over Brusilov, but this hope vanished as soon as it became clear that Dankl’s whole front was in full retreat and that Plehve’s Army had appeared in Auffenberg’s Rear.

On 11 September, General v. Hötzendorf gave the order for a general retreat to the Wisłoka (55.77-55.88). The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armies were to begin the movement the same night.

The Battle of Galicia had been won by the Russians. The tactical measure of its success is witnessed by more than 100,000 prisoners and numerous trophies. The strategic result was also great. It is true that the plan for a “Canne” had not succeeded. The Austro-Hungarian armies were not annihilated. Though badly shaken, they were brought back by General v. Hötzendorf towards Krakau, had time to recover, and continued the struggle. The Russian Command cannot be made responsible for this failure. The plan was beyond the reach of the forces employed to achieve it. But the chief thing had been done: a victory had been won on the line that was decisive for the Russian theater at the beginning of the campaign of 1914. The results of this decisive success were not slow to show themselves. The reverses of Samsonov and Rennenkampf were, strategically speaking, balanced.

Here is how the situation created by the victory of Galicia is estimated by the ally of the Austro-Hungarians, General Ludendorff: “The Austro-Hungarian Army had been completely beaten (vollständig geschlagen) and was retreating beyond the San, sustaining exceptionally heavy losses, and pursued by the Russians. It was necessary to help the Austro-Hungarian Army if we did not want to see it destroyed ... It was necessary to give it immediate support, and no help could be too great. We were no longer in a position to send troops to the Western (French) Front.”

From the point of view of military theory the Battle of Galicia is of great interest. From beginning to end it is dominated by maneuvering. Numerically, both sides are almost equal. Organization and technical equipment are alike. On both sides the troops fight gallantly. Thus, the skill of the respective commands becomes the deciding element in the scales of victory.

29.3.1 Scenario Length
The Great Battle for Galicia is 12 GTs long and begins on August 23 (GT 4) and ends September 17 (GT 15).

29.3.2 General Information:
A. Map: The Central, South, and Eastern Maps are in play. On the Central Map use only hexes found south of hexrow xx.55 (exclusive), hexes south of the Pilica River, and hexes east of hexrow 74.xx (exclusive).

B. Strategic plans: The 3 LW, A-H and Russian SW Front Strategic plans covered in 21.4, 21.5 and 21.6 respectively are in play.

C. REPLs, RPs, and RR Engs:
See the Points table for the number of Replacement Points, Rail Points, and RR Engineers received. Use the “1st Interphase” row for the number of Rail Points at start of the scenario.

D. Railheads:
- A-H Player: 06.109, 11.98, 12.91, 17.83, 77.78, 78.78.
- Russian Player: 05.91, 05.109, 16.83.

4 Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, p.55.
29.3.3 The Great Battle for Galicia Special Rules:
29.3.3a GT 4 Russian Forced March: No Russian unit may conduct a Forced March during the Russian Movement Phase of GT 4.

29.3.3b Prepared Attacks and VPs: The maximum number of VP that can be earned through Prepared Attacks during GTs 13, 14 and 15 is limited.

GT 13: 5
GT 14: 3
GT 15: 1.

29.3.4 Withdrawals & Releases
A. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN:

GT 7
RELEASE:
Infantry Brigade: 111 ls
Infantry Asset: 10 ls
Artillery: FsAR 3

WITHDRAW:
Corps Units: det 5/1, det 14/5, det 33/5, det 24/10, det 30/11 (x2)
Infantry Divisions: 1, 2, & 3-det 11

GT 10
RELEASE:
Infantry Asset: Mikolajow

WITHDRAW:
Infantry Divisions: 4-det 11

GT 14
RELEASE:
Infantry Divisions: 75 r

29.4 Battle for Galicia (one map)

Historical Notes—see 29.3.

29.4.1 Scenario Length
Battle for Galicia is 12 GTs long and begins on August 23 (GT 4) and ends September 17 (GT 15).

29.4.2 General Information:
A. Map: Use the Galicia map.

B. Strategic plans: The 3 LW, A-H and Russian SW Front Strategic plans covered in 21.4, 21.5, and 21.6 respectively are in play.

C. REPLs, RPs, and RR Engs:
See the Points table for the number of Replacement Points, Rail Points, and RR Engineers received. Use the “1st Interphase” row for the number of Rail Points at start of the scenario.

D. Railheads:
• A-H Player: 11.98, 12.91, 17.83.
• Russian Player: 05.91, 16.83, 61.67.

29.4.3 Battle for Galicia Special Rules:
29.4.3a GT 4 Russian Forced March: No Russian unit may conduct a Forced March during the Russian Movement Phase of GT 4.

29.4.3b Prepared Attacks and VPs: The maximum number of VP that can be earned through Prepared Attacks during GTs 13, 14 and 15 is limited.

GT 13: 5
GT 14: 3
GT 15: 1.

29.4.3c Russian Supply Source: The railroad that exits the map at hex 07.100 cannot be used as a Russian supply source (it does not connect to the Russian RR net).

29.4.4 Withdrawals & Releases
A. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN:

GT 7
RELEASE:
Infantry Brigade: 111 ls
Artillery: FsAR 3

WITHDRAW:
Corps Units: det 5/1, det 14/5, det 33/5, det 24/10, det 30/11 (x2)
Infantry Divisions: 1, 2, & 3-det 11

GT 10
RELEASE:
Infantry Asset: Mikolajow

WITHDRAW:
Infantry Divisions: 4-det 11

GT 14
RELEASE:
Infantry Assets: Halicz, Jaroslau
B. RUSSIAN:

GT 7
RELEASE:
Artillery: 3/4 hvy.

GT 14
Important: Disregard the 75 r Infantry Division’s release.
Historically, upon release, the 75 r Division moved to the western bank of the Vistula River. Had Ivangoord been in jeopardy the division would surely have remained as garrison.

29.4.5 Determining Victory
Victory is determined at the end of GT 15 as per rule 27.0 (and 29.4.3b).

29.5 The Tannenberg Campaign

Historical Notes
The Tannenberg Campaign has been covered by many books in varying amounts of detail. A brief overview may be found in Norman Stone’s “The Eastern Front, 1914-1917.” For a more in-depth look this designer recommends Sir Edmund Ironside’s “Tannenberg, The First Thirty Days in East Prussia,” written in 1925. The best known description from the Russian point of view written in English is the translation of Golovine’s “Russian Campaign of 1914: The Beginning of the War and Operations in Prussia.”

29.5.1 Scenario Length
The Tannenberg Campaign is 15 GTs long and begins on August 16 (GT 1) and ends September 17 (GT 15).

29.5.2 General Information:
A. Map: Use only the North Map. No units may move west of the Vistula River except German units in Rail Mode. Such German units must have a destination hex (8.2.3 pt. 3) east of the Vistula River.

B. Strategic plans: The Russian NW Front Strategic plans covered in 21.6 are in play.

C. REPLs, RPs, and RR Engs:
See the Points table for the number of Replacement Points, Rail Points, and RR Engineers received. Use the “Start” row for the number of Rail Points at start of the scenario.

D. Railheads:
• German Player: 63.39.
• Russian Player: 39.19, 42.33, 63.40.

E. Other Deployment Information:
Russian Player: The Army Area of Attachment Boundary line between the First and Second Armies runs between 38.35 and 50.29.

29.5.3 Tannenberg Campaign Special Rules:
29.5.3a GT 1 Russian Forced March: No Russian unit may conduct a Forced March during the Russian Movement Phase of GT 1.

29.5.3b Special Russian Off-Map RR Lines: The Russian player may move on and trace supply over certain off-map rail hexes.
CASE 1: Those RR lines that run through the Praga hex (57.51) on the Center Map. The distance between the Praga hex and the listed hexes are the following:
• Between 46.46 & Praga: 10 double-track hexes
• Between 53.45 & Praga: 3 double-track and 3 single-track hexes
• Between 60.46 & Praga: 7 single-track hexes
These distances do not count the (double-track) Praga hex itself. Thus, a unit that rails off the map at 46.46 and enters at 60.46 traverses 11 double-track hexes and 7 single-track hexes.

CASE 2: The off-map RR line that connects hexes 25.16 and 25.23. The distance between the two hexes (exclusive) is: 4 single-track and 15 double-track hexes.

29.5.3c Prepared Attacks and VPs: The maximum number of VP that can be earned through Prepared Attacks during GTs 13, 14 and 15 is limited.

GT 13: 5
GT 14: 3
GT 15: 1.

29.5.3e Inactive Units:
Russian: At the start of the scenario, all units attached to the Russian Second Army are Inactive and may not move until activated on GT 2.

29.5.4 Withdrawals & Releases
A: GERMAN:

GT 4
RELEASE:
Infantry Brigade: 5 lw
Infantry Asset: Allenstein
Artillery: 2/15r

WITHDRAW:
Corps Unit: det 2/1

GT 7
RELEASE:
Artillery: 2/2gdr

GT 8
RELEASE:
Artillery: 17r

B. RUSSIAN:

GT 2
RELEASE:
Corps Unit: 56 r/26 R

ACTIVATE:
SECOND Army

GT 4
RELEASE:
Corps Unit: det 3 gd/23
Infantry Division: 57 r

RELEASE during the Counter Movement Phase of the German player turn:
Corps Unit: 3 gd/23
GT 5
RELEASE:
Corps Units: det 26/2, det 4+16/6
Artillery: Second

GT 7
RELEASE:
Artillery: 1/1 hvy
WITHDRAW:
Corps Units: det 29/20, det 27/3, det 3 gd/23

GT 8
RELEASE:
Infantry Asset: 302+

GT 9
RELEASE:
Artillery: 2/1 hvy.

GT 11
WITHDRAW:
Corps Units: det 26/2, det 4+16/6

29.5.7 Determining Victory
Victory is determined at the end of GT 15 as per rule 27.0 (and 29.5.3c).

PLAY NOTE: Units that have moved off the edge of the map DO NOT count as destroyed. Any units that move off the map can not be returned to play (1.2.2).

The scenario starts with 1 VP for the Germans (for Mlawa).

29.6 The Grand Campaign, the Eastern Front 1914

Historical Notes
The best introduction to this campaign is Norman Stone’s “The Eastern Front, 1914-1917.” See the bibliography for further reading.

29.6.1 Scenario Length
The Grand Campaign begins on August 16 (GT 1) and ends December 19 (GT 47).

29.6.2 General Information:
A. Map: All five maps are in play.
B. Strategic plans: All Strategic plans covered in 21.4, 21.5, and 21.6 are in play.
C. RPs, REPLs and RR Engs: All Rail Points and Replacement Points received each Inter-Phase, and RR Engineers received each GT, are listed on the Game Turn Record Track.
D. Railheads:
- A-H Player: 06.109, 11.98, 12.91, 17.83, 77.78, 78.78.
- German Player: 63.39, 78.43, 81.71.
- Russian Player (North): 39.19, 42.33, 63.40.
- Russian Player (South): 05.91, 05.109, 16.83, 61.67, 72.61, 76.48, 76.59.

E. Other Deployment Information:
Russian Player: The Army Area of Attachment Boundary line between the First and Second Armies runs between 38.35 and 50.29.

29.6.3 Grand Campaign Special Rules:
29.6.3a West of the Vistula: No belligerent’s units may move across the Vistula River, to its west bank, during GTs 1, 2 and 3. All units that set-up west of the Vistula River are “Inactive” at start.

29.6.3b GT 1 Russian Forced March: No Russian unit may conduct a Forced March during the Russian Movement Phase of GT 1.

29.6.3c GT 4 Russian Forced March: No Russian unit attached to the Third, Fourth, Fifth, or Eighth Armies may conduct a Forced March during the Russian Movement Phase of GT 4.

29.6.3d Inactive Units:
A. GERMAN: At the start of the scenario, all German units west of the Vistula are Inactive and may not move until activated on GT 4. There are no restrictions on German units east of the Vistula (other than 29.6.3a).

>> B. austro-hungarian: At the start of the scenario, all A-H units and the 3 LW Corps are Inactive and may not move until activated during the Russian Reinforcement, Withdrawal and Activation Phase of GT 4.

C. RUSSIAN: At the start of the game, all Russian units, except those attached the Russian First Army, are Inactive and may not move. There are no restrictions on units attached to the First Army. Units of each army (including the Warsaw garrison) are activated on the GTs indicated below in the Withdrawals and Releases list.

29.6.3e Prepared Attacks and VPs: The maximum number of VPs that can be earned through Prepared Attacks during GTs 41 through 47 is limited.

GT 41: 5
GT 42: 4
GT 43 & 44: 3
GT 45 & 46: 2
GT 47: 1.

29.6.4 Withdrawals & Releases
A. GERMAN:

GT 4
RELEASE:
Infantry Brigade: 5 lw
Infantry Asset: Allenstein
Artillery: 2/15r

WITHDRAW:
Corps Unit: det 2/1

ACTIVATE:
All units west of the Vistula that do not bear a release or garrison indicator.

GT 7
RELEASE:
Artillery: 2/2 gd r

GT 8
RELEASE:
Artillery: 17r
**GT 11**
RELEASE:
Infantry Division: Bredow

**GT 14**
RELEASE:
Infantry Brigade: 21 lw
WITHDRAW:
Infantry Assets: Gabriel

**GT 16**
RELEASE:
Infantry Brigade: gz lw
Artillery: 2/1gdr, 1/1r, 2/4r, 5r+6r
WITHDRAW:
Infantry Assets: Tilsit, Braunsberg, Mehlsack, Osterode, Dtsch-Eylau, Elbing, Pr. Holland

**GT 24**
RELEASE:
Artillery: 2/15, 2/5r, 2/11r, 1/2gdr, 1/15r

**GT 30**
RELEASE:
Infantry Assets: Kulm.

**GT 32**
RELEASE:
Army Unit: AG F Major
Infantry Brigade: Jonas, Wernitz
Infantry Assets: Marienburg.
WITHDRAW:
Infantry Assets: Kothe, Kraewel, Krieger.

**GT 34**
RELEASE:
Corps Units: Rz/PN
Infantry Division: Menges
Infantry Assets: Dirschau.

**B. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN:**

**GT 4**
ACTIVATE:
FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, and FOURTH Armies, and German 3 LW Corps

**GT 7**
RELEASE:
Infantry Brigade: 111 ls
Infantry Asset: 10 ls
Artillery: FsAR 3
WITHDRAW:
Corps Units: det 5/1, det 14/5, det 33/5, det 24/10, det 30/11 (x2) Infantry Divisions: 1, 2, & 3-det 11

**GT 10**
RELEASE:
Infantry Asset: Mikolajow
WITHDRAW:
Infantry Division: 4-det 11

**GT 14**
RELEASE:
Infantry Assets: Halicz, Jaroslau

**GT 16**
WITHDRAW:
Corps Unit: Train/Kummer

**GT 22**
RELEASE:
Artillery: FsAR 2

**GT 26**
WITHDRAW:
Independent Infantry Brigade: det 6 et

**GT 35**
RELEASE:
Artillery: FsAB 5

**C. RUSSIAN:**

**GT 2**
RELEASE:
Infantry Division: 56 r/26 R
ACTIVATE:
SECOND Army

**GT 4**
RELEASE:
Corps Unit: det 3 gd/23
Infantry Divisions: 57 r, 59 r, 79 r
ACTIVATE:
THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, and EIGHTH Armies
RELEASE during the Counter Movement Phase of the German player turn:
Corps Unit: 3 gd/23

**GT 5**
RELEASE:
Corps Units: det 26/2, det 4+16/6
Artillery: Second
ACTIVATE:
Warsaw garrison and 5 c, 3 gd c, fn gd 3 and fn gd 4.

**GT 6**
RELEASE:
Artillery: 1/2 hvy
ACTIVATE:
NINTH Army.

**GT 7**
RELEASE:
Artillery: 1/1 hvy, 2/5 hvy, 3/4 hvy
WITHDRAW:
Corps Units: det 29/20, det 27/3, det 3 gd/23

**GT 8**
RELEASE:
Infantry Asset: 302+
Artillery: 2/3 hvy, 2/2 hvy.

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GT 9
RELEASE:
Artillery: 2/1 hvy

GT 11
RELEASE:
Artillery: 3/3 hvy, 3/5 hvy, 3/2 hvy.
WITHDRAW:
Corps Units: det 26/2, det 4+16/6.

GT 14
RELEASE:
Infantry Divisions: 75 r

GT 16
RELEASE:
Infantry Divisions: 81 r

GT 17
RELEASE:
Infantry Division: 73 r
WITHDRAW:
det 22+24/1, det 28/20, det 46/25.

GT 19
WITHDRAW:
270/68 r.

GT 25
WITHDRAW:
Praga.

GT 26
RELEASE:
Infantry Division: 55 r, 77r

GT 37
RELEASE:
Infantry Asset: O.sch.rgt

GT 38
RELEASE:
Infantry Division: 63 r

29.7 Historical Post-GT3 Set-up in Prussia
This set-up is for players desiring to begin the campaign game scenario as of August 23rd (beginning with the 1st Inter-Phase).

29.7.1 Affected Scenarios
The Historical Post GT 3 Set-up in Prussia may be incorporated into The Grand Campaign scenario (29.6).

29.7.2 General Information
All general information is identical to that found in 29.6.2 except as follows:

B. Strategic plans: No Strategic plan has been fulfilled or abandoned.

D. Railheads:
• German: 47.12, 46.20, 46.22, 48.25, 49.30, 50.33, 53.33, 58.33, 62.36, 66.37, 78.43, 81.71.
• Russian Player (North): 42.20, 43.30, 63.40.

29.7.3 Special Rules
These special rules are in addition to the special rules found in 29.6.3.

A. Russian First and Second Armies: All Russian units attached to the First and Second Armies may not conduct a Forced March during the Russian Movement Phase of GT 4.

B. Only German and Russian northern forces affected: This setup affects only the units listed in the German grid and the Northern section of the Russian grid. Follow the setups for the Campaign game (29.6) for all other forces and for all reinforcements arriving on GT 4 or later not listed in the Northern section of the grids.

29.7.4 Determining Victory
Victory is determined at the end of GT 47 as per rule 27.0 and 29.6.3f.
The scenario starts with 1 VP for the Russians (for Gumbinnen).
30.0 Sample of Play—The Battle of Tannenberg Play-through

This sample of play is designed to illustrate the use of the 1914, *Twilight in the East* rules. The Play-through simulates GT 5 as the situation was in southern East Prussia at the beginning of the Battle of Tannenberg (historically about Aug 26-27). Note that the decisions made (i.e., supply paths, movement, attacks and retreat paths) are those made during the actual battle and are not necessarily the best ones in game terms. They were chosen to illustrate concepts of proper play. We suggest you set-up this sample of play and move the counters as you read through the sample.

### 30.1 German Set-up

**EIGHTH ARMY CHART**

- *EIGHTH* Major Depot #1—74.26.
- *EIGHTH* Major Depot #2—66.28.

**Independent Formations track**

- 3r/MO—65.32.
- 20 lw—66.33.
- Allenstein—66.28.
- Dtsch-Eylau—70.32.
- Osterode—66.31.
- 1 lw—reinforcement enters at hex 85.27 in Rail Mode during German Movement phase.

**17 Corps track**

- 35/17 [–2 steps]—56.25.
- 6 lw—57.27.
- 17 (Corps Train unit)—57.24.

**1 R Corps track**

- 1r/1 R—58.28.
- 36r/1 R—58.28.
- 1 R (Corps Train unit)—58.25.

#### 20 Corps track

- 41/20—65.34.
- 37 lw [–1 step] [–1 CEL]—65.34.
- 70 lw—65.33 in Level One IP.
- Graudenz—65.33.
- 20 (Corps Train unit)—67.32.

**1 Corps track**

- 2/1 [–1 step]—68.36.
- 1/1 [–1 step]—68.35.
- 5 lw—68.37.
- 2/15r (Artillery unit)—68.35.
- 1 (Corps Train unit)—70.32.

### 30.2 Russian Set-up

Use only the Second Army Chart

**SECOND ARMY CHART**

- *SECOND* Minor Depot—52.44.
- PRAGA Depot (3 range)—60.46.
- Railhead Marker—63.39.

**Independent Formations track:**

- 4 c—53.29.
- 6 c—65.37.
- 15 c—67.38.
- 3 gd/23 [–2 steps]—32.37 (MP expended marker—3 MPs to entrain).
- det 3 gd/23—65.37.

#### 1 Corps track:

- 22/1 [–2 steps]—65.36.
• 24/1 [–2 steps]—65.35.
• 1 (Corps Train unit), Artamonov leader marker—62.41.

6 Corps track:
• 4/6 [–2 steps]—57.28.
• 16/6 [–2 steps][–1 CEL]—57.29.
• 6 (Corps Train unit) “incomplete 1”, Blagoveshchenski leader marker—56.33.

13 Corps track:
• 1/13 [–1 CEL]—62.34.
• 36/13—61.32.
• 13 (Corps Train unit) “incomplete 1”—58.36.

15 Corps track:
• 6/15 [–1 step]—63.35.
• 8/15 [–1 step]—62.35.
• 2/23 [–1 CEL] with 2/23 Low Supply marker—see rule 24.4) —63.35.
• 15 (Corps Train unit) “incomplete 2”—60.39.

30.3 GT 5: The Russian Player Turn
A. Determine Weather: The Russian Player rolls 1d6. The result is 4, which is normal weather.

B. RUSSIAN PLAYER TURN PHASES:
1. Reinforcement, Withdrawal and Activation Phase (5.4.1):
None.

2. Attachment Phase (5.4.2)
No attachment changes. No change to the Second Army’s Strategic Plan; its objectives remain Osterode (66.31), Allenstein (61.30) and Seeburg (58.28)—see rule 21.6.1.

3. Pontoon Bridge Phase (5.4.3)
None.

4. Supply Phase (5.4.4):
The Russian Player follows the steps listed in rule 5.4.4. Initially he flips all Depot and Corps Train units to their front sides and removes any AP allocated markers. (In this way he starts anew.) Next he checks the supply state of all his units following the sequence found in rule 14.4. He begins by checking if his army’s Major and Minor Depot units have a valid LOC (14.2.1). The RR lines running from the Major Depot at 51.40 and the Minor Depot at 52.44 are friendly operational and clear of EZOC, so a valid LOC exists for both.

Then the Russian Player checks each Corps Train unit’s supply status. Beginning from right to left, the Russian Player finds that, tracing from the Major Depot, the Corps Train units of the 6th Corps, 13th Corps, and 15th Corps are all ten hexes distant. However, the Major Depot’s standard range is 6, an insufficient amount. Therefore, the Russian Player flips it to its Extended Side (back side) to utilize its 10 range to supply all three corps.

The 1 Corps Train unit has two options. One, it can receive supply from the Praga unit because it is within range (6 hexes traced over a single track RR line = 3 range). Or, since it is stacked on a friendly operational RR line hex, it may simply receive supply from the railway (14.2.2).

Next the Russian Player checks the supply status of each individual unit. Supply is traced from the supply source to the unit seeking supply (14.1). He proceeds along the front from right to left. Beginning with the 6th Corps he finds the supply range from the 6 Corps Train to the 16/6 Division to be 4 1/2 hexes and to the 4/6 Division to be 5 1/2 hexes. Unfortunately for the Russian Player, the 6 Corps Train’s range is reduced by 2 due to its “Incomplete 1” status (24.3). It now has a normal range of 3 and an extended range of 7. Therefore, to place these divisions in supply, he must flip over the corps train unit to its extended range side and mark both divisions as being in “Low Supply” (14.4 pt. 4). The 4th Cavalry Division in hex 53.29, although not attached directly to the 6th Corps can use the Corps Train unit to trace supply (14.3.1). It must do this because it has no other options. Since the train unit is on its extended side the cavalry division is marked in “Low Supply.”

The Russian Player now checks supply for the 13th Corps. The 1/13 Division is 4 hexes and the 36/13 Division is 5 hexes from the 13 Corps Train. Once again, since the 13 Corps Train is in “Incomplete 1” status, it must be flipped over to extend its range. Therefore the Russian Player marks the two divisions as being in “Low Supply.”

Next the Russian Player checks supply for the 15th Corps. Both the 6/15 and 8/15 Divisions are 5 hexes from the 15 Corps Train. The train unit is in “Incomplete 2” status so its range is reduced by 1 (range 4). To supply its divisions the corps train unit must be flipped to its extended side. However, since both divisions are within 5 hexes of a friendly operational RR hex the Russian Player can avoid flipping the corps train unit. He marks the two divisions in “Low Supply” for tracing to a RR line hex at greater than a 3 hex range (14.2.3).

The 2/23 Division is a special case. Due to rule 24.4 it would in all cases be, at best, in Low Supply. It is 5 hexes from a friendly
operational RR Line hex and therefore not “Out of Supply.” (Notice that the 2/23 Division can trace supply from the 15 Corps Train [if it so desired] because it is attached to the 15th Corps. It can be so attached because the 23rd Corps’ train unit has not yet arrived on map—see the exception in rule 6.2.2.)

The 3 gd/23 Division is stacked in hex 32.37 on a friendly operational RR line and is therefore in supply.

The Russian Player then checks supply for the 1st Corps. The 22/1 Division is within 5 hexes by tracing supply first over the friendly operational RR line running from 62.41 to 63.39 (2 hexes x $\frac{1}{2} = 1$ hex) and then to hexes 64.39, 64.38, 65.37 and 65.36. However, the 24/1 Division is not within 5 hexes, being 6 hexes away. To avoid flipping the 1 Corps Train to its extended side (and therefore placing the 22/1 Division in low supply) the Russian Player decides to have the 24/1 Division trace supply to a friendly operational RR hex (in this case within 5 hexes) and marks it in “Low Supply.” The asset unit det 3 gd/23, due to its proximity to the 22/1 Division, is attached to that division (6.4.1). It is within normal range of the train and in supply. (It should be noted that this asset unit could trace supply to the friendly operational RR line hex at 63.39 if it so desired.)

The 6 cavalry unit does the same as the det 3 gd/23 and is in supply. The 15 cavalry, however, cannot trace a 3 hex path from a friendly operational RR line but it can be placed in supply by tracing a path from the 1 Corps Train unit of 5 hexes length: 2 hexes along a RR line at $\frac{1}{2}$ a hex each, plus 4 hexes overland. (Notice that the final hex, a wetlands hex, is entered via a roadway—see 14.1.2.)

5. RR Engineering Phase (5.4.5)
On GT 5 the Russian Player receives 7 RR Engineer points. He decides to use two of these to prepare the RR lines in hexes 64.39 and 64.38, pushing the railhead marker two hexes to 64.38. Five RR engineer points are used outside the bounds of this example of play.

6. Phasing Player Movement phase (5.4.6)
The Russian Player (2nd Army Commander Samsonov), under orders to advance due to the Strategic Plan (and not knowing what awaits him), continues to push on into Eastern Prussia.

[Proceeding from right to left along the front]

6 Corps: On the night of the 25/26, the 6th Corps received orders to march to the assistance of the 13th Corps. In accordance with his orders Blagoveschenski prepared to march the 16th Division, and a brigade of the 4th Division, south of Lake Daday to Allenstein. Early in the morning the unexpected news arrived that an enemy brigade was in Lautern, and later that the enemy was occupying Seeburg. Thinking that the enemy forces were a lightly held screen thrown out by a retreating enemy, the 4th Division commander, Lt.-Gen. Komarow, decided on an aggressive reconnaissance in-force. The 16th Division spent most of the 26th marching first toward Allenstein and then, as the 4th Division’s reconnaissance escalated into a pitched battle, counter-marching back to its assistance. By the end of the day the 16/6 Division had marched over 20 miles.

The 4/6 Division, finding the German 6 lw Brigade to its front, decides to attack; it expends 3 MPs to place a Prepared Attack marker pointed at hex 57.27. The 4c Division moves through hexes 54.30, 55.29 to hex 56.29 expending 5 MPs ($1\frac{1}{2} + 1\frac{1}{2} + 2$).

The 16/6 Division moves through 58.30 and 59.30 into 60.31 and then retraces its steps through 59.30 into hex 58.30. This move expends 8 MPs and requires performing a Forced March (8.3) of 11/2 MPs (rounded to 2). The Russian Player must make a Forced March EC modifying the die roll by +3 (+2 for 2 MPs and +1 for Low Supply); he rolls 2d6 with a result of 7. He compares the modified result of 10 to the 16/6 Division’s current CEL of 9; 10 is greater than 9, and therefore the division fails its EC by one. Since the 16/6 Division currently consists of 8 steps it is considered a “large infantry” unit. By cross referencing the “Failed EC by” 1 row with the “large infantry” column we get a result that the 16/6 Division’s Combat Effectiveness status must be lowered by one (~1E). Therefore its current CE status is now –2.

The 6 Corps train unit expends 7 MPs while stationary to change its status from “Incomplete 1” to “Incomplete 2” (flip over the incomplete status marker to its back side).

13 Corps: On August 26th the 13th Corps was ordered to proceed north to occupy Allenstein. This the corps did slowly for it believed a German division to be in the vicinity, was suffering from supply related problems and it heard the sounds of battle coming from its left where the 15th Corps was in combat.

The 1/13 Division moves to hex 62.32 via hex 62.33 expending 3 1/2 MPs (2 + 1 1/2). The 36/13 Division moves forward one hex to hex 61.31. The 13 Corps Train expends 7 MPs while stationary to change its status from “Incomplete 1” to “Incomplete 2.” The Russian Player flips over the incomplete status marker to its back side.

15 Corps: On August 26th the 15th Corps made good progress, pursuing the enemy defeated at Lana-Orlau.
The 8/15 Division moves via hexes 62.34, 63.33 into hex 63.32 expending 6 MPs (3 + 1/2 + 1/2). The 6/15 Division moves via hexes 63.34, 63.33 into hex 64.33 (in an EZOC) and places a Prepared Assault marker at hex 65.33. This consumes 91/2 MPs (11/2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 3), therefore requiring a Forced March of 21/2 MPs (rounded up to 3 MPs). The Russian Player must make a Forced March EC modifying the die roll by +5 (+4 for 3 MPs and +1 for Low Supply); he rolls 2d6 with a result of 5. He compares the modified result of 10 to the 6/15 Division’s current CEL of 10; 10 being equal to the division’s current CEL, it passes its EC. The 2/23 Division (attached to the 15th Corps) moves through hex 63.34 into hex 64.34 (in an EZOC) and places a Prepared Assault marker pointed at hex 65.33. This consumes 7 MPs (1/2 + 1/2 + 1 + 3).

1 Corps: The 1st Corps had been ordered to hold the position Soldau - Gilgenburg.

Both the 22/1 and 24/1 Divisions expend 7 MPs while stationary to dig Level 1 Improved Positions (place an IP 1 marker on each division). The detachment unit det 3 gd/23 moves to join the 2/23 Division by marching through hexes 64.37, 63.36, into hex 63.35; consuming 6 MPs (11/2 + 1/2 + 3). The nearby 6c and 15c Cavalry Divisions remain stationary as does the 1 Corps Train unit (it being at the extreme range of the Praga Depot unit, its source of AP).

The independent 3 gd/23 Division (its Attachment Marker is in the Independent Formations box) entraining in Sokolka (32.37) expends 1 MP to complete entraining. The Russian Player flips the RR MPs expended marker to its Rail Mode side and designates Mlawa (63.39) as its destination. The unit proceeds by rail over the double-track RR line to Praga (57.51), a total of 27 hexes (2 1/4 MPs, at a rate of 12 hexes per MP), then by single-track to Mlawa, a total of 16 hexes (2-2/3 MPs, at a rate of 6 hexes per MP), and begins to detrain with its remaining MP. The 3 gd/23 Division’s Rail Mode marker is marked with a MP expended marker oriented to the 1 side.

This completes the Russian Player’s Movement phase.

7. Non-Phasing Player Counter Movement phase (5.4.7):

The German Player begins to spring his trap.

17 Corps: On the night of 25/26 August the corps was given orders to advance to Bischofsburg with the object of attacking the Russian corps there, in cooperation with the 1st Reserve Corps and 6th Landwehr Brigade.

The 6 lw Brigade, finding an enemy Prepared Assault marker pointed at it, may not leave its hex. (It does have the ability to expend MPs while stationary in the hex but declines to do so.)

The 36/17 Division marches to the 6 lw Brigade’s support by entering hex 57.27, expending 3 MPs to do so (2 MPs for the hex and 1 for the EZOC).

The 35/17 Division moves via hexes 56.26, 56.27 and performs a Forced March to enter hex 56.28 (in an EZOC). This costs 6 MPs (11/2 + 2 + 1/2 + 1), and therefore the division performs a Forced March of 2 MPs. The German Player must make a Forced March EC, modifying the die roll by +2; he rolls 2d6 with a result of 9. He compares the modified result of 11 to the 35/17 Division’s current CEL of 11; the two being equal, the division passes its EC. Also as the 35/17 Division enters hex 56.28, the German Player must announce to the Russian Player that he has entered a cavalry unit’s ZOC. The Russian 4c Division chooses to “react” into hex 56.30 (rule 9.1, Trigger 1).

The 17 Corps Train unit moves to hex 59.25 via hex 58.25. Hex 58.25 contains the 1 R Corps Train unit, and therefore the cost of road movement is increased by 1/2 MP, so that the move costs 31/2 MPs (2 + 1/2).

1 R Corps: The 1r/1 R Division moves to hex 58.29 via hex 59.28 expending 7 MPs (2 + 1 + 2 + 1 + 1, entering two hexes at 2 MPs each, plus woods, plus exiting and entering an EZOC). Therefore, the division performs a Forced March of 3 MPs. The German Player must make a Forced March EC, modifying the die roll by +4; he rolls 2d6 with a result of 4. He compares the modified result of 8 to the 1r/1 R Division’s current CEL of 8; 8 is less than 10 and therefore the division passes its EC.

The 36r/1 R Division remains stationary, while the 1 R Corps Train unit moves to hex 60.26 via hex 59.25. Hex 59.25 contains the 17 Corps Train unit, and therefore the cost of road movement is increased by 1/2 MP, so that the move costs 31/2 MPs (2 + 1/2).

20 Corps: The 20th Corps was ordered to maintain its position and support the attack of the 1st Corps.

The 70 lw and Graudenz Brigades, finding enemy Prepared Assault markers pointed at them, may not leave their hex. The remainder of the units attached to the 20th Corps and the independent 3r/MO Division and 20 lw Brigade remain stationary.

1 Corps: General Francois and his 1st Corps had over the previous several days been transported by railway from the Insterburg region to their present location. Francois initially hesitated to attack, awaiting his heavy artillery.
The 1/1 Division moves to hex 66.35 in an EZOC via hex 67.34 expending 4\(\frac{1}{2}\) MPs (2 + 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) + 1). This is a Forced March of 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) MP (rounded to 1 MP). There is no Forced March EC modifier (+0); the German Player rolls 2\(d6\) with a result of 4. The result of 4 is less than the 1/1 Division’s current CEL of 11; it therefore passes its EC.

The 2/1 Division moves to hex 66.36 via hex 67.36. Since this move costs 4\(\frac{1}{2}\) MPs the division must perform a Forced March of 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) MP (rounded to 1 MP). There is no Forced March EC modifier (+0); the German Player rolls 2\(d6\) with a result of 7. The result of 7 is less than the 2/1 Division’s current CEL of 11; therefore the division passes its EC.

The 5 lw Brigade moves from hex 68.37 into hex 67.37 and the ZOC of the Russian 15c Cavalry Division (expending 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) MPs). The German Player announces to the Russian Player that he has entered a cavalry unit’s ZOC. The Russian 15c Division chooses to “react” into hex 66.39. The 5 lw Brigade then continues by performing a Forced March, expending 3 MPs to enter hex 66.37, which is adjacent to the Russian 6c Cavalry Division in hex 65.37. Once again the German Player announces to the Russian Player that he has entered a cavalry unit’s ZOC. The Russian 6c Division chooses not to react and remains in its hex. Since the 5 lw Brigade performed a Forced March to enter hex 66.37 (expending a total of 5\(\frac{1}{2}\) MPs) it must make a Forced March EC modified by +2, the German Player rolls 2\(d6\) with a result of 6. He compares the modified result of 8 to the 5 lw Brigade’s current CEL of 9; 8 is less than 9, and therefore the brigade passes its EC.

The 2/15r artillery unit marches to hex 67.35, expending 3 MPs.

The 1 Corps Train unit, following the advance of the corps’ troops, moves via hex 70.33 to hex 69.33, expending 3 MPs (1\(\frac{1}{2}\) + 1\(\frac{1}{2}\)). This completes the German Player’s Counter Movement phase.

8. Phasing Player Attack Phase (5.4.8)

Since the Russian Player is the phasing player it is his attack phase, and he follows the sequence in rule 10.2.

The Russian Player must first designate with White Attack Markers any attacks he plans to conduct that are not Prepared Attacks. He places one such marker upon the 22/1 Division pointing at the German 5 lw unit in hex 66.37. This commits the Russian to conducting three attacks: two attacks that are required due to the placement of Prepared Attack markers and the voluntary attack that has the White Attack marker.

The Russian Player resolves each attack following the sequence found in rule 10.2.1.

- The Russian Player first decides to resolve the required attack of the 4/6 Division into hex 57.27 occupied by the German 36/17 Division and 6 lw Brigade. Both players announce whether they wish to allocate an Artillery Ammunition Point (AP). The 4/6 Division traces a supply path from the Second Army’s Major Depot, via the 6 Corps Train unit. Since both the Major Depot and corps train units are on their extended sides, the Russian Player marks both with an AP Allocated marker oriented to the 1 AP side. The German units trace a path to the Eighth Army’s Major Depot #2 unit, via the 17 Corps Train unit. Only 1 AP need be expended because both German units are attached to the same corps command. Note that this AP expenditure need not be recorded—see 10.5.4.

Both sides sum up their respective combat strengths. The Russian Player determines the 4/6 Division’s strength to be 13 (8 steps plus 5 artillery value), while the German strength is 27 points (19 defensive strength plus 8 artillery value). The ratio of 13:27 rounds to 1:2, and these are the initial odds. The players now determine odds column shifts. The Russian receives one shift in his favor for the Prepared Attack marker, so the final odds are 1:1.

The Russian Player rolls 2\(d6\) with a result of 6; he cross-references this with the odds column to determine the result. A 6 results in no effect to either the attacker or the defender. Both players then refer to the Step Loss Results Table (SLRT) to determine losses. They first must determine the magnitude of the battle. Because the total number of units on both sides was two divisions and one brigade, the magnitude is Medium. Both players separately roll 1\(d6\). The Russian Player’s result is 3; the German’s is 5. For the Russian the only applicable DRMs are +2 for opponent’s artillery (8 points), for a result of 5, which results in 1 step loss. For the German the applicable DRMs are +1 for opponent’s artillery (5 points) and –1 for German rolls, for a result of 5, resulting in 1 step loss. The German Player assigns it to the 6 lw Brigade.

Next both player’s formations must make an EC (one die roll per stack). The Russian 4/6 has a total DRM of +3 (+2 for a step loss and +1 for Low Supply). He rolls 2\(d6\) with a result of 8, modified to 11. Since the 4/6 Division’s CEL is 10 it fails by 1. This reduces the 4/6 Combat Effectiveness status to –1 (CEL = 9). The German Player has two affected formations and although he rolls only once, the roll affects both individually. The 6 lw Brigade suffered a step loss for +2 DRM, while the 36/17 Division’s roll is unmodified. He rolls 2\(d6\) with a result of 9. For the 6 lw Brigade this is modified to 11. Since the 6 lw Brigade’s CEL is 9 it fails by 2. This reduces the 6 lw Combat Effectiveness status to –1 (CEL = 8). For the 36/17 Division the 2\(d6\) result is unmodified 9. The 36/17 Division passes the EC because its current CEL is 10. This concludes this combat, and the Russian Player removes the Prepared Attack marker.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** See the note following the summary of the German Counter AttackPhase.

- The second attack the Russian Player decides to resolve is the required attack by the 2/23 and 6/15 Divisions into hex 65.33 occupied by the German 70 lw and Graudeniz Brigades. Both players announce that they wish to allocate APs. Because the Russian units are attached to the same corps, the Russian Player need expend only one AP. Both the 6/15 and 2/23 Divisions trace a supply path from the Second Army’s Minor Depot, via the 15 Corps Train unit. The Russian Player must flip both the 15 Corps Train unit and the Minor
Depot unit to their extended sides to have sufficient supply range. Because they are now on their extended sides, he must mark them with an AP Allocated marker oriented to the 1 AP side. (Note that each time a Minor Depot unit allocates an AP, whether it is on its front or rear side, it is marked with an AP Allocated marker—see 10.5.4.) The German units trace a path to the Eighth Army’s Major Depot unit #1, via the 20 Corps Train unit. Only 1 AP need be expended because both German units are attached to the same corps command (and it need not be recorded).

Both sides sum up their respective combat strengths. The Russian Player determines his strength to total 29 points, while the German strength is 15 points. The ratio of 29:15 rounds to 2:1, and these are the initial odds. The players now determine odds column shifts. The Russian receives one shift in his favor for the Prepared Attack marker. The German Player’s units are in a Level One IP, but the shift for the Level One IP is cancelled by the Russian’s “high trajectory” (or “heavy”) artillery (10.8). Thus, the final odds are 3:1.

The Russian Player then rolls 2d6 with a result of 7; he cross-references this with the odds column to determine the result. A 7 results in an attacker +1 SLRT DRM, while the defender retains one hex unless in an IP. (In this case the defender is in an IP, and therefore the retreat result is ignored.) Both players then refer to the Step Loss Results Table (SLRT) to determine losses. They first must determine the magnitude of the battle. Because the total number of units on both sides was two divisions and two brigades, the magnitude is Medium.

Both players separately roll 1d6. The Russian Player’s result is 3; the German’s is 4. For the Russian the only applicable DRMs are +1 from the CRT result and +1 for opponent’s artillery (3 points), for a result of 5, meaning 1 step loss (assigned to the 2/23 Division). For the German the only applicable DRMs are +2 for opponent’s artillery (10 points) and –1 for German rolls, for a result of 5, meaning 1 step loss (assigned to the 70 lw Brigade).

Next both player’s formations must make an EC. The Russian Player rolls 2d6 twice, once for each stack. Since the Russian 2/23 suffered a step loss in combat and is marked with Low Supply it suffers a +3 DRM. The 2/23 Division’s roll result is an 8, modified to 11. Since its CEL is 9 it fails by 2 and lowers its Combat Effectiveness status by 1 to –2. The 6/15 Division’s roll is a 5. It passes its EC easily. Now the German checks Combat Effectiveness. The 70 lw suffers a step loss so its EC roll is modified by +2. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 7. Both brigades pass, the 70 lw just barely. This concludes this combat.

• The Russian’s final combat is initiated by the 22/1 Division against the German 5 lw Brigade in hex 66.37. (Although this attack is launched voluntarily, the Russian Player must resolve it due to the placement of a White Attack marker.) Both players announce that they wish to allocate APs. The 22/1 Division traces a supply path from the Praga Depot unit, via the 1 Corps Train unit. The 22/1 Division is within the corps train’s range of 5 so the AP expenditure does not need to be recorded. The German unit traces a path to the Eighth Army’s Major Depot unit #1, via the 1 Corps Train unit.

Both sides sum up their respective combat strengths. The Russian Player determines his strength to total 13 points, while the German strength is 10 points. The ratio of 13:10 rounds to 1:1, and these are the initial odds. The players now determine odds column shifts, but there are none. Thus, the final odds are 1:1.

The Russian Player then rolls 2d6 with a result of 9; he cross-references this with the odds column to determine the result. A 9 results in an attacker +1 SLRT DRM and a defender –1 SLRT DRM. Both players refer to the Step Loss Results Table (SLRT) to determine losses. They first must determine the magnitude of the battle. Because the total number of units on both sides was only one division and one brigade (less than two divisions), the magnitude is Small. Both players separately roll 1d6. The Russian Player’s result is 6; the German’s is 3. For the Russian the only applicable DRMs are +1 from the CRT result and +1 for opponent’s artillery (4 points), for a result of 4, resulting in a +1 EC DRM. For the German the only applicable DRMs are –1 from the CRT result, +1 for opponent’s artillery (5 points) and −1 for German rolls for a result of 5, also resulting in a +1 EC DRM.

Next both player’s formations must make an EC. The Russian 22/1 Division’s total DRMs is +1 (from the SLRT result). He rolls 2d6 with a result of 4, modified to 5. Since the 22/1 Division’s current CEL is 10 it passes.

Now the German Player must check Combat Effectiveness. The 5 lw Brigade suffered a +1 DRM. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 9, which is modified to 10. Since the 5 lw Brigade’s CEL is 9 it fails and has its CEL reduced by one to 8. This concludes this combat and the Phasing Player’s Attack Phase.

9. Non-Phasing Player Counter Attack Phase (5.4.9)

Now it is the German Player’s chance to make any desired attacks. Since the non-phasing player cannot expend MPs to place Prepar Assault markers during the Counter Movement phase there can be no mandatory attacks. He places four White Attack Markers, one each on the following units: the 35/17 Division (pointing at the Russian 4/6 Division in hex 57.28); the 1r/1R Division (pointing at the Russian 16/6 Division in hex 58.30); the 37/20 Division (pointing at the Russian 2/23 Division in hex 64.34); and the 41/20 Division (pointing at the Russian 24/1 Division in hex 65.35).
Both players announce that they wish to allocate APs. The German 1/1 R Division traces a supply path from the Eighth Army’s Major Depot #2 via the 1 R Corps Train unit. The Russian 16/6 Division traces a supply path from the Second Army’s Major Depot via the 6 Corps Train unit.

Because both the Major Depot and 6 Corps Train unit are on their extended sides, the players must mark the AP expenditures. Both are already marked with an AP Allocated marker oriented to the 1 AP side, so in the case of the Major Depot the Russian Player now rotates the AP Allocated marker so it is oriented to the 2 AP side. The AP marker on the 6 Corps Train unit is flipped to the “no more AP” side because, when on its extended side, the corps train’s AP limit is 2 (and both have now been expended).

Both sides sum up the respective combat strengths. The Russian Player determines his total strength is 17 points, while the German strength is 13 points. The ratio of 13:17 rounds to 1:1, and these are the initial odds. The players now determine odds column shifts. The only shift is due to the Blagoveshchenski Leader Marker (25.4), one to the right, for a final odds column of 2:1. (The Russian Player flips the Blagoveshchenski Leader marker to its reverse side.)

The German Player then rolls 2d6 with a result of 6; he cross-references this with the odds column to determine the result. A 6 results in an attacker +1 SLRT DRM except German results, and a defender retreat 1 hex unless in an IP. The Russian 16/6 Division is not in an IP, and the Russian Player therefore retreats it one hex to hex 57.30.

Both players then refer to the Step Loss Results Table (SLRT) to determine losses. They first must determine the magnitude of the battle. Because the total number of units on both sides was two divisions, the magnitude is Medium. Both players separately roll 1d6. The Russian Player’s result is 3; the German’s is 2. For the Russian applicable DRMs are +2 for the leader and +1 for opponent’s artillery (4 points) for a result of 5, meaning 1 step loss. For the German the applicable DRMs are +1 for opponent’s artillery (5 points) and –1 for German rolls, for a result of 2, meaning a +1 EC DRM.

Next both player’s formations must make an EC. The German Player rolls 2d6 with a result of 5; modified by +1 for the SLRT result, the final result is 6. It passes its EC. Now the Russian checks Combat Effectiveness. Since the 16/6 Division retreated one hex (+1), suffered 1 step loss (+2) and is in Low Supply (+1), its total EC DRM will be +3. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 9, modified to 12. The 16/6 Division fails its EC by 4. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 8, modified to 13. The 16/6 Division fails its EC by 5. This results in its Combat Effectiveness status being reduced by 2 to –4 (demoralized) and requires a retreat of two hexes (one hex for failing by 5 and one hex when becoming demoralized). It retreats to hex 57.32 via hex 57.31. WHAM! The German Player declines to advance into the defending unit’s vacated hex. This concludes this combat.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** On August 26th the Russian 16/6 Division suffered heavily. And on the 27th it retreated further in a demoralized fashion.

- Next the German Player announces a combined attack by the 35/17 Division, 36/17 Division, 6 lw Brigade and 36r/1 R Division upon the Russian 4/6 Division in hex 57.28. (Notice that a White Attack marker does not have to be placed on every unit engaged in the attack; only one marker pointed at the hex to be attacked is required.)

The German Player announces he wishes to allocate an AP. Since the German units are attached to two separate corps the German Player must expend two APs. All the German units trace a supply path from the Eighth Army’s Major Depot #2; the 36r/1 R via the 1 R Corps Train unit, the other formations via the 17 Corps Train unit.

The Russian Player would like to supply his division with AP but the 6 Corps Train unit is marked “no more AP.”

Next both sides sum up their respective combat strengths. The Russian Player determines his strength to total 11 points; while the German strength is 47 points. The ratio of 47:11 rounds to 4:1, and these are the initial odds. The players now determine odds column shifts. The attacking German units are able to achieve a Flank Attack for two column shifts to the right. These shifts are off-set by one shift left because the German units are attached to more than one corps (in this case the 1R and 17 Corps). In addition, the Russian leader Blagoveshchenski is involved for a column shift right. (The Russian Player now removes the Blagoveshchenski Leader marker from the game.) Thus, the final odds are 6:1.

The German Player then rolls 2d6 with a result of 4; he cross-references this with the odds column to determine the result. A 4 result is no effect to the attacker but the defender must retreat 3 hexes. The Russian 4/6 Division retreats to hex 56.31 via hexes 57.29 and 56.30.

Both players then refer to the Step Loss Results Table (SLRT) to determine losses. They first must determine the magnitude of the battle. Because the total number of units on both sides was four divisions and one brigade, the magnitude is Large. Both players separately roll 1d6. The Russian Player’s result is 4; the German’s is 6. For the Russian the applicable DRMs equal equal +7, +2 for the leader, +4 for opponent’s artillery (19 points) and +1 defender flanked, for a result of 11, meaning 3 step losses. Since the 4/6 Division’s current strength is now less than 6 steps (in this case 4 steps), the Russian Player flips it to its reverse (reduced) side and marks it with a 1 step loss marker.

For the German the only applicable DRM is –1 for German rolls (notice there is no DRM for Russian artillery because it did not receive an AP), for a modified result of 5, meaning 1 step loss (assigned to the 36r/1 R Division) and a +1 EC DRM (assigned to the 35/17 Division).

Next both player’s formations must make an EC. The German Player rolls 2d6 three times, once for each stack. Since the 36r/1 R has suffered a step loss in combat it suffers a +2 DRM. The 36r/1 R’s roll results in a 7, modified to 5.
9. Since its CEL is 10 it passes. The roll for the stack containing the 36/17 and 6 lw is an unmodified 6. Both formations pass. And the 35/17 EC DRM is +1 due to the SLRT result; it rolls 2d6 resulting in 10, modified to 11. It passes its EC (barely).

Now the Russian checks Combat Effectiveness. Since the 4/6 Division retreated 3 hexes (+3) and suffered 3 step losses (+6), and due to these step losses it is flipped to its reduced side (+1), it is in Low Supply (+1), and was flanked (+1), its total EC DRM will be +12. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 7, modified to 19. The 4/6 Division fails its EC by 10. This results in its Combat Effectiveness status being reduced by 3 to –4 (demoralized) and requires the Russian Player to retreat it two hexes (one hex for failing by between 8 and 11 and one hex for becoming demoralized). He retreats it to hex 56.33 via hex 56.32. BAM! The German Player now decides to advance the 35/17 Division into hex 57.28. This concludes this combat.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** The Russian 4/6 Division commander, initially believing he was attacking a weak force, found himself in a pitched battle with the German 36/17 Division and 6 lw Brigade. As the day progressed the Russian position became critical as the German 35/17 Division attacked from the flank. By 6 pm the Russian’s ordered a withdrawal and the division began to disintegrate.

On August 26th the Russian 4/6 Division suffered 50% casualties and retreated roughly 40 kilometers. Its demoralized retreat continued on the 27th.

- Next the German Player conducts an attack by the 37/20 Division into hex 64.34 occupied by the Russian 2/23 Division.

Both players announce that they wish to allocate APs. The German 37/20 Division traces a supply path from the Eighth Army’s Major Depot #1 via the 20 Corps Train unit. The 2/23 Division traces a supply path from the Minor Depot unit, via the 15 Corps Train unit. Since both the Minor Depot and train units are on their extended sides and are already marked with AP Allocated markers oriented to the 1 AP side, the Russian Player flips the AP Allocated markers on both units to their “No More AP” sides.

Next both sides sum up their respective combat strengths. The Russian Player determines his total strength to be 18 points, while the German strength is 16 points. The ratio of 16:18 rounds to 3:1, and these are the initial odds. The players now determine odds column shifts. There is a one column shift left because the attacking German units are attached to more than one corps. There is one column shift right due to the incompetent Russian 1st Corps leader Artamonov (whom the Russian Player now flips to his reverse side—see rule 25.3) who provides a one column shift to the attacker. The Level 1 IP’s effect is negated by the presence of High Trajectory artillery on the German’s side. Thus, the final odds are 3:1.

The German Player then rolls 2d6 with a result of 4; he cross-references this with the odds column to determine the result. A 4 result is no effect to the attacker, while the defender gets a +1 SLRT DRM and must retreat 2 hexes. The Russian Player retreats the 24/1 Division to hex 64.37 via hex 64.36 and removes its IP marker. Both players then refer to the Step Loss Results Table (SLRT) to determine losses. They first must determine the magnitude of the battle. Because the total number of units on both sides was four divisions, the magnitude is Large. Now both players separately roll 1d6. The Russian Player’s result is 3; the German’s is 2. For the Russian the applicable DRMs are +2 for being led by Artamonov, +1 for the CRT result and +4 for opponent’s artillery (21 points), for a result of 10, meaning 3 step losses. For the German the only applicable DRMs are +1 for opponent’s artillery (5 points) and –1 for German rolls, for a modified result of 2, meaning a step loss (assigned to the 41/20 Division).

Next both player’s formations must make an EC. The German Player then rolls 2d6 three times, once for each stack. The 1/1 and
2/1 Divisions have no EC DRMs and roll 8 and 7 respectively, and both pass their ECs. The 41/20 has a +2 DRM from the step loss. The German rolls 2d6 with a result of 3, modified to 5; it easily passes its EC.

Now the Russian checks Combat Effectiveness. Since the 24/1 Division retreated 2 hexes (+2), suffered 3 step losses (+6) and was flipped to its reduced side (+1), and is in Low Supply (+1), its total DRM will be +10. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 12, modified to 22. The 24/1 Division fails its EC by 12. This results in its Combat Effectiveness status being reduced by 4 to –4 (demoralized) and requires a two hex retreat (one hex for failing by 12 and one hex for demoralization). The Russian Player retreats it to hex 63.39 via hex 64.39. OUCH! The German Player now decides to advance the 1/1 Division into hex 65.35. This concludes this combat and the Counter Attack Phase.

10. Post-Combat Phase (5.4.10):
   a. Cavalry Retirement Step: Any cavalry units that find themselves adjacent to an enemy unit may retire one hex. Here, the only eligible cavalry unit is the Russian 6c unit in hex 65.37. It chooses not to retire.
   b. Remove Markers Step: There are no Artillery Retreated or Combat Strength 1/2 markers to remove (or flip).

This concludes the Russian Player Turn.

30.4 GT 5: THE GERMAN PLAYER TURN

1. Reinforcement, Withdrawal and Activation Phase
   The German Player determines that he will receive the 1 lw Division at hex 85.27 (in Rail Mode). He places the 1 lw Division’s Attachment Marker on the Independent Formations track on the 8th Army organizational display.

2. Attachment Phase
   The German Player does not make any attachment Changes.

3. Pontoon Bridge Phase: None.

4. Supply Phase:
   The German Player follows the sequence listed in rule 5.4.2. Since none of his depot or corps train units are found on their extended sides, nor are they marked with AP expended markers, the German Player proceeds directly to checking each unit’s supply status. To do so he first checks to see that his army’s Major Depot units have a valid LOC. The RR line running from the Major Depot #1 at 74.26 to the map edge is friendly operational and clear of EZOC, so a valid LOC exists. The same can be said for the RR line running from hex 66.28, so the Major Depot #2 also has a valid LOC.

   Then the German Player checks each corps train unit’s supply status. The German Player’s Major Depot #1 places the 1 and 20 Corps Train units in supply, while the Major Depot #2 places the 17 and 1 R Corps Train units in supply.

   Next the German Player checks the supply status of each individual unit. In a quick glance he sees that all the formations attached to corps are in supply. The only special supply checks he needs to make are for the 3r/MO Division and 20 lw Brigade because they are independent formations (i.e., they are not attached to a corps). The 3r/MO Division (as well as the 20 lw Brigade) has several possible sources of supply. It could trace directly from either Major Depot unit (it is in range of both) or it could receive supply directly from the nearest friendly operational RR line (a RR line passes through the hex adjacent to the 3r/MO Division). In this case, the German Player chooses to use the RR line to supply both the 3r/MO Division and the 20 lw Brigade. All units are thus in supply.

5. RR Engineering Phase
   On GT 5 the German receives 2 RR Engineer points. These are used outside the bounds of this example of play.

6. Phasing Player Movement phase:
   The German Player starts with the units on his left and proceeds to those on his right.

17 Corps: The German Player has the 35/17 Division begin the pursuit of the defeated Russian 6th Corps by moving it into hex 57.29 and announcing to the Russian Player that he has entered a cavalry unit’s ZOC. The Russian 4c Division chooses to “react” into hex 56.31. The 35/17 continues moving south, pushing the Russian cavalry unit before it. It enters hexes 56.30, 56.31 and 56.32 while the cavalry reacts into hexes 56.32, 56.33 and finally 56.34. This move costs the 35/17 Division 10 MPs (each hex costing 2/1 MPs, 1/2 for via road movement and +1 for the cavalry ZOC). This is a Forced March of 2 MP so the German makes an EC modified by +2; he rolls 2d6 resulting in a 4, and the EC is easily passed.

   Next, the German Player moves the 36/17 Division to hex 57.31 (entering a ZOC) passing through hexes 57.28, 57.29 and 57.30 at a cost of 81/2 MPs. This requires a Forced March of 1/2 MP (rounded to 1 MP). The 36/17 Division makes an unmodified EC, and passes by rolling an 8.

   Now the German Player turns to the 6 lw Brigade. Since the 6 lw Brigade had suffered in the previous day’s battle and a rear guard is required due to Russian First Army cavalry activity (outside this example), the German decides to leave the brigade in hex 57.27. It expends 7 MPs to recover one CEL. The 35/17 Brigade’s Combat Effectiveness status is raised to 0 from –1. The German Player moves the attachment marker one box to the left.

   Finally, the 17 Corps Train unit moves to hex 57.28 via hexes 58.26, 57.26 and 57.27. When passing through hex 57.27 while using road movement the train unit is required to expend an addition 1/2 MP due to the presence of the 6 lw Brigade in the hex. So the total MP cost of the move was 61/2 MPs.

   To more easily supply these units, the German Player moves the Eighth Army Major Depot #2 unit by rail to hex 64.25, expending 2/3 of a MP. The depot is followed by the Allenstein infantry unit which also moves to hex 64.25.

1 R Corps: The 1r/1 R Division moves to hex 59.31 via 58.30 and 59.30, expending 51/2 MPs. The 36r/1 R Division follows to hex 59.30 via 58.29 and 58.30, expending 7 MPs. The 1 R Corps Train unit moves through hexes 59.26, 59.27 into hex 58.28 expending 41/2 MPs.
20 Corps: The 41/20 and 37/20 Divisions each expend 3 MPs to place a Prepared Attack marker pointing at hex 64.34. The 70 lw and Graudenz Brigades remain in hex 65.33 with one of them expending 7 MPs to upgrade the Level One IP to Level Two. The 3r/MO Division expends 7 MPs to construct a Level One IP. The 20 Corps Train unit remains stationary as does the 20 lw Brigade.

1 Corps: The 1/1 and 2/1 Divisions and the 5 lw Brigade expend 3 MPs each to place a Prepared Attack marker pointed at hex 65.36. The 2/15r artillery unit moves into hex 66.36 (3 MPs = 2 for the hex, 1 for the EZOC) and then expends 3 MPs to place a Prepared Attack marker pointed at hex 65.36. The 1 Corps Train unit moves to hex 68.35 via hex 69.34, expending 3 MPs.

Last but not least the German Player moves in his reinforcement, the 1 lw Division. It enters at hex 85.27 in Rail Mode. He declares Osterode (hex 66.31) to be its destination. (Notice that no RPs are expended when declaring the 1 lw Division’s destination because it is a reinforcement entering from the map edge—see rule 16.1.1). The German counts 25 hexes along the double-track railroad line from 85.27 to 66.31 via Marienburg and Deutsch-Eylau. This costs 2 (and 1/12th) MPs. The German spends 4 further MPs to detrain the Division (as it consists of 4 RCPs), then marches into hex 64.31 via hex 65.31 (3 MPs for a total MP expenditure of 9–1/12 MPs (rounded to 9). This is a Forced March of 2 MPs. So the German proceeds to make a Forced March EC modified by +2; he rolls 7, modified to 9. The 1 lw Division’s has a 9 CEL and therefore passes.

This completes the German Player’s Movement phase.

7. Non-Phasing Player Counter Movement phase:

HISTORICAL NOTE: The Russian center, not knowing of the destruction of the two flanks and not receiving any new orders, continues forward.

Significant for game play is the fact that the Russian 2nd Army has not as yet abandoned its Strategic Plan. A Strategic Plan’s movement restrictions keep the infantry moving toward one of the army’s objectives—see rule 21.1.2.

The Russian Player proceeds from right to left along the front.

6 Corps: Since both the 4/6 and 16/6 Divisions are demoralized they are exempted from the movement requirements of the Strategic Plan (21.1.2). Both divisions want to place as much space between themselves and the enemy as possible. The 6 Corps Train unit moves to hex 54.34 at the cost of 3 MPs (2 for the terrain, and 1 to exit the ZOC). Next the 4 Cavalry Division moves to hex 55.33. In this way when the 4/16 Division enters hex 56.34 it will be able to use road movement without paying the costs of the friendly division occupying the hex. Now the 4/16 Division moves via hex 56.34 to hex 56.35, expending 41/2 MPs (11/2 MPs for hex 56.34, +1 MP for leaving an EZOC and 2 MPs for hex 56.35). This is a Forced March of 1 MP. The Russian Player must make a Forced March EC modified by +1 for being in Low Supply. He rolls 2d6 with a lucky result of 3. The 4/6 Division’s current CEL is only 6 but it passes its EC. Next the 16/6 Division moves to hex 56.34 via 57.33, expending 4 MPs. This is a Forced March of 1/2 MP (rounded to 1). The Russian Player must make a Forced March EC modified by +1 for being in Low Supply. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 10, modified to 11. The 16/6 Division fails its EC by 5. At this point the 16/6 Division consists of 7 steps, so cross referencing the “Failed EC by 5” row with “Large Infantry” column we find the 16/6 Division suffers 1 CEL reduction and 1 step reduction. Because the 16/6 Division’s CEL cannot be lowered beyond –4 (demoralized) it suffers a second step loss instead (8.3.2b). And because this is the 16/6 Division’s fifth step loss the Russian Player flips it to its reduced side (and removes the step loss marker).

13 Corps: The 36/13 Division moves forward one hex and enters Allenstein, hex 61.30. The VP earned for occupying Allenstein (5 VP) and for achieving the army’s strategic plan operational objective on GT 5 (10 VP) are recorded (27.0). The 1/13 Division moves forward one hex to hex 63.31, expending 4 MPs (3 MPs for the hex, 1 MP for the EZOC). This is a Forced March of 1/2 MP (rounded to 1 MP). This results in an EC modified by +1 for being in Low Supply. The dice roll result is 6, modified to 7; the unit passes. The 13 Corps Train unit remains stationary.

15 Corps: The 8/15 Division moves one hex to hex 64.32, expending 21/2 MPs (1 1/2 for the hex and 1 MP for the EZOC). The 2/23 Division may not move because an enemy Prepared Attack marker is pointing at its hex. The 6/15 Division, the detachment unit det 3 gd/23 and 15 Corps Train unit remain stationary.
1 Corps: The 22/1 Division may not move because an enemy Prepared Attack marker is pointing at its hex. The 6c Division decides not to move (so as to support the 22/1 Division’s flank). The demoralized 24/1 Division, desiring to put space between itself and the enemy, moves to hex 63.41 via hex 63.40. The 15c Division and 1 Corps Train unit remain stationary.

The 3 gd/23 Division in Rail Mode in Mlawa (63.39) expends 3 MPs to complete detraining (it had previously been marked with a MP expended marker oriented to the 1 side) and then expends a further 1½ MPs to enter hex 64.39. This is a Forced March of 1 MP and requires an unmodified EC. The Russian Player rolls 2d6 with a result of 11; since the 3 gd/23 Division’s CEL is 10 it fails and has its CEL reduced by 1. Notice that the 3 gd/23 Division was able to perform a Forced March after detraining; this was due to the fact that it had unexpended MPs remaining after completing the detraining process (in this case it had 1/2 a MP remaining).

This completes the Russian (Non-Phasing) Player’s Counter Movement phase.

8. Phasing Player Attack Phase

Since the German Player is the phasing player it is his attack phase.

First the German Player must designate with White Attack Markers any attacks he plans to conduct that are not mandatory. He declares there are none so he does not place any White Attack markers.

• The first attack to be resolved is the attack required due to the placement of Prepared Attack markers by the 37/20 and 41/20 Divisions into hex 64.34, occupied by the Russian 2/23 Division.

The German Player announces that he wishes to use an AP. The German divisions trace a supply path from the Eighth Army’s Major Depot #1 via the 20th Corps Train unit. The unfortunate Russian Player would like to use an AP but finds the 15 Corps Train unit is marked with a “No More AP” marker.

Both sides sum up their respective combat strengths. The Russian Player determines his strength to total 12 points, while the German strength is 31 points. The ratio of 31:12 rounds to 3:1, and these are the initial odds. The players now determine odds column shifts. The German receives one shift in his favor for the Prepared Attack marker, and therefore the final odds are 4:1.

The German Player rolls 2d6 with a result of 11; he cross-references this with the odds column to determine the result. An 11 result is attacker +1 SLRT DRM/defender –1 SLRT DRM. Both players refer to the Step Loss Results Table (SLRT) to determine losses. Since the battle consisted of a total of three divisions, the magnitude is Medium. Both players separately roll 1d6. The Russian Player’s result is 1; the German’s is 3. For the Russian the applicable DRMs are –1 for the CRT result and +3 for opponent’s artillery (14 points), for a result of 3, meaning a +1 EC DRM. For the German the applicable DRMs are +1 for the CRT result and –1 for German rolls, for a modified result of 3, meaning a +1 EC DRM (assigned to the 37/20 Division). Notice that there was not an SLRT modifier for Russian artillery. Because the Russian was unable to supply an AP, the artillery’s value was considered to be zero.

Next both player’s formations must make an EC. The German Player rolls once for the stack although each division checks separately. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 11. The 37/20 Division’s result is modified by +1 for the SLRT result, therefore resulting in a 12 result. The 41/30 Division passes its EC but the 37/20 Division does not. The German Player reduces the 37/20 Division’s Combat Effectiveness status to –2. Now the Russian checks Combat Effectiveness. Since the 2/23 Division suffered a +1 EC DRM result and is marked as being in Low Supply, its total EC DRM is +2. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 9, modified to 11. The 2/23 Division fails its EC by 4. This results in a “–2E + 1 hex retreat” result. The 2/23 Division’s CEL prior to the combat was –3 so the Russian Player reduces its Combat Effectiveness status by 1 to –4 (demoralized) and retreats it an additional hex. Since one required CEL reduction could not be fulfilled, it suffers a step loss and is marked with a D1 marker (Disordered—see 7.4). It retreats to hex 62.35 via hex 63.34. The German Player decides to advance the 41/20 Division into the defending unit’s vacated hex. This concludes this combat.

• The German Players announces his last attack will be conducted by the 1/1 and 2/1 (with 2/15r artillery) Divisions and 5 lw Brigade into hex 65.36, occupied by the Russian 22/1 Division.

Both players announce that they wish to allocate APs. The German formations (all attached to the 1st Corps) trace a supply path from the Eighth Army’s Major Depot #1 via the 1 Corps Train unit. The Russian traces from the Praga Depot via his 1 Corps Train unit.

Both sides sum up their respective combat strengths. The Russian Player determines his strength to total 17 points, while the German strength is 44 points. The ratio of 44:17 rounds to 3:1, and these are the initial odds. The players now determine odds column shifts. The German receives one shift in his favor for the Prepared Attack marker, and therefore the final odds are 4:1.

The German Player rolls 2d6 with a result of 11; he cross-references this with the odds column to determine the result. An 11 result is attacker +1 SLRT DRM/defender –1 SLRT DRM. Both players refer to the Step Loss Results Table (SLRT) to determine losses. Since the battle consisted of a total of three divisions, the magnitude is Medium. Both players separately roll 1d6. The Russian Player determines his strength to total 12 points, while the German’s is 3. For the Russian the applicable DRMs are –1 for the CRT result and +3 for opponent’s artillery (14 points), for a result of 3, meaning a +1 EC DRM. For the German the applicable DRMs are +1 for the CRT result and –1 for German rolls, for a modified result of 3, meaning a +1 EC DRM (assigned to the 37/20 Division). Notice that there was not an SLRT modifier for Russian artillery. Because the Russian was unable to supply an AP, the artillery’s value was considered to be zero.

Next both player’s formations must make an EC. The German Player rolls once for the stack although each division checks separately. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 11. The 37/20 Division’s result is modified by +1 for the SLRT result, therefore resulting in a 12 result. The 41/30 Division passes its EC but the 37/20 Division does not. The German Player reduces the 37/20 Division’s Combat Effectiveness status to –2. Now the Russian checks Combat Effectiveness. Since the 2/23 Division suffered a +1 EC DRM result and is marked as being in Low Supply, its total EC DRM is +2. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 9, modified to 11. The 2/23 Division fails its EC by 4. This results in a “–2E + 1 hex retreat” result. The 2/23 Division’s CEL prior to the combat was –3 so the Russian Player reduces its Combat Effectiveness status by 1 to –4 (demoralized) and retreats it an additional hex. Since one required CEL reduction could not be fulfilled, it suffers a step loss and is marked with a D1 marker (Disordered—see 7.4). It retreats to hex 62.35 via hex 63.34. The German Player decides to advance the 41/20 Division into the defending unit’s vacated hex. This concludes this combat.

• The German Players announces his last attack will be conducted by the 1/1 and 2/1 (with 2/15r artillery) Divisions and 5 lw Brigade into hex 65.36, occupied by the Russian 22/1 Division.
Russian Player’s result is 3; the German’s is also 3. For the Russian the applicable DRMs are +2 for Artamonov and +4 for opponent’s artillery (22 points), for a result of 9, meaning 2 step losses. For the German the applicable DRMs are +1 for opponent’s artillery (5 points) and –1 for German rolls, for a result of 3, meaning +1 EC DRM (assigned to the 1/1 Division).

Next both player’s formations must make an EC. The German Player rolls 2d6 with a result of 8, modified to 10, and so both pass their ECs. The 1/1 has a +1 DRM from the SLRT result. The German rolls 2d6 with a result of 8, modified to 9, and it also passes its EC. Now the Russian checks Combat Effectiveness. Since the 22/1 Division retreated 2 hexes (+2) and suffered 2 step losses (+4), its total EC DRM will be +6. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 12, modified to 18. The 22/1 Division fails its EC by 8. The Russian Player reduces its Combat Effectiveness status by 3 to –3 and retreats it one hex to 64.39. The German Player now decides to advance the 2/1 Division into hex 65.36. This concludes this combat and the German Attack Phase.

9. Non-Phasing Player Counter Attack Phase

Now it is the Russian Player’s chance to make any desired attacks. Since the non-phasing player cannot expend MPs to place Prepared Assault markers during the Counter Movement phase there are never any mandatory counter attacks.

He places one White Attack Marker upon the 6/15 Division pointed towards hex 65.32.

• The Russian Player announces that both the 8/15 and 6/15 Divisions will conduct the attack against hex 65.32. Hex 65.32 is occupied by the German 3r/MO Division in a Level One IP. The German Player declares the allocation of an AP. Since the 3r/MO Division is an independent formation it cannot trace supply from a corps train unit and must attempt to trace directly from a depot unit. The Eighth Army Major Depot #1 unit is within range: 13 hexes via double track RR line (1/4 hex each = 3 hexes) plus two hexes overland.

The Russian 15 Corps Train unit is marked “No more AP” so may not allocate an AP.

Both sides sum up their respective combat strengths. The Russian Player determines his strength to total 18 points, while the German strength is 15 points. The ratio of 18:15, rounds to 1:1, and these are the initial odds. Next any odds column shifts are determined; there is one left for the effect of the 3r/MO Division’s Level One IP because there is no Russian artillery to negate the shift. (Notice that if the Russian had allocated an AP the Level One IPs CRT column shift would have been negated (13.2.1)). The final odds are thus 1:2.

The Russian Player rolls 2d6 with a result of 3; he cross-references this with the odds column to determine the result. A 3 result is attacker no effect */defender retreat one hex. The German Player retreats the 3r/MO Division to hex 66.33 and removes the IP marker. Both players then refer to the Step Loss Results Table (SLRT) to determine losses. They first must determine the magnitude of the battle. Because the total number of units on both sides was three divisions, the magnitude is Medium. Now both players separately roll 1d6. The Russian Player’s result is 5; the German’s is 6. For the Russian there are no applicable DRMs, for an unmodified result of 5, which results in 1 step loss (assigned to the 8/15 Division). For the German the only applicable DRM is –1 for German rolls, for a result of 5, which results in 1 step loss.

Next both player’s formations must make an EC. The Russian Player rolls 2d6 twice, once for each stack. The Russian 8/15 Division suffers a total DRM of +2 (+2 for the step loss, +1 for being in Low Supply and –1 for the * CRT result). The 8/15 Division’s roll is a 7, modified to 9. Since its CEL is 10 it passes. The 6/15 Division’s Low Supply +1 DRM is offset by the * CRT result and is therefore unmodified. He rolls a 6 and passes the EC. Now the German checks Combat Effectiveness. The 3r/MO Division receives a +1 DRM for the one hex retreat and +2 for the step loss, for a total EC DRM of +3. He rolls 2d6 with a result of 9, modified to 12. The 3r/MO Division’s CEL is 10, so it fails by 2. The German Player lowers its Combat Effectiveness status to –1. The Russian Player declines to advance into the vacated hex. This concludes this combat and the Counter Attack Phase.

10. Post-Combat Phase

a. Cavalry Retirement Step: Any cavalry units that find themselves adjacent to an enemy unit may retire one hex. The only eligible cavalry unit is the Russian 6c unit in hex 65.37. It chooses to retire to hex 65.38.

b. Marker Removal Step: There aren’t any to remove or flip.

This concludes the German Player Turn and GT 5.

HISTORICAL COMMENT: The Battle of Tannenberg resulted in the total destruction of the Russian Second Army’s center. The entire 13th and 15th Corps were completely destroyed along with most of a brigade of the 2/23 Division. The Russian 6th Corps escaped, although severely depleted, as did the 1st and remainder of the 23rd Corps.
Components Errata

Organization Displays

- Change the display for the German EIGHTH Army to have 8 infantry tracks (one of which is for the KG Corps) and 2 cavalry tracks.

Map

- The Bukowina Holding Box (23.4) is missing from the South Map. Designate and use any convenient section of border area as the box.
- On the north map, the border between East Prussia and Russian Poland should be a national border. The border just north of the Posen region (near Thorn) should be a provincial border.
- The Dniester is a Grand River from hexside 17.99 / 18.100 (Nizniow) southeast to the map edge.

Counters

- The backs of the A-H and German RPs x 10 markers should be blank. The information that appears there now (RP x 1 + ½) should instead appear on the backs of the RPs x 1 markers.
- The Corps ID text or background colors are wrong on some Russian units:
  2C: Change the color on the attachment marker to medium blue.
  3C: Change the text on the attachment marker to black.
  4C: Change the color on the attachment marker to light blue.
  12: Change the color on the four attachment markers and on the 12/12 infantry division to brown.
  18: Change the text on the Corps Train to white.
  20: Change the color on the Corps Train unit to blue-green.
  27R: Change the color on the Corps Train and attachment marker to tan.
- Similarly, the stripe indicated the corps color is wrong on the Incomplete markers for the Russian 3 Corps (should be brown) and the Russian 20 Corps (should be blue-green).
- The size of the Russian 2 Op formation on its attachment marker should indicate a division (XX), not a brigade.
- The attachment marker for the German 3 r division is missing its corps identifier. It is part of the MO Corps.
- Change the ratings on the German EIGHTH army marker to 8 +2C (see Organization Displays above).
  (Counters correcting all of the above issues are available in issue 20 of C3i Magazine.)
- The unit symbol color for the following Russian cavalry brigades should be pale yellow (indicating usage in the southern scenarios) rather than the tan/gold they are now: tr cs 1, tr cs 2, and tr cs 3.
### Counter Abbreviations

**For All Sides:**
- AG: Armée Gruppe
- C, c.: Cavalry
- Det: Detachment
- Field Rwy: Field Railway
- GD: Guard
- R, r: Reserve
- bd: Brigade

**Russian**
- Brest-L: Brest-Litowsk
- CN, cn: Caucasian
- Comb: Combined
- Comp: Composite
- cs: Cossack (cavalry type)
- d: Don
- DN: Dniester
- fn gd: Frontier Guard
- GN: Grenadier
- hvy: Heavy
- ku: Kuban
- Novo-G: Novo-Georgievsk
- O.sch.rgt.: Officiers School regiment
- op: Opolchenie
- rf: Rifle
- S: Siberian
- TK: Turkistani
- t-b: Trans-Baikal
- tr: Terek
- us: Ussuri

**Austro-Hungarians:**
- et: Landsturm Etappen
- GAR: Gebirgs-Artillery-Regiment
- FsAR: Festungs-Artillery-Reg.
- FsAB: Festungs-Artillery-Bn.
- HN: Hofmann
- ls: Landsturm
- m: Marsch
- P-B: Plantzer-Baltin
- pol: Polish
- sch: Kaiserschutzen
- SY: Szurmay
- t: Landsturm Territorial

**Germans:**
- Bg: Breugel
- BU: Breslau
- Dn: Doussin
- ez: Ersatz
- FR: Frommel
- GZ, gz: Graudenz
- Hfn: Hoffmann
- KG, kg: Königsberg
- ls: Landsturm
- lw: Landwehr
- MO: Morgen
- PN: Posen
- Rz: Reiszweitz
- TN: Thorn
- W: Woyrsch
- Wn: Westernhagen
- Wz: Wernitz

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